

JPRS-WER-84-019

21 February 1984

West Europe Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

21 February 1984

WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL

FINLAND

- Soviet General Responds to Article on Warsaw Pact Arms Lead
(UUSI SUOMI, 19, 28 Dec 83) 1
- NATO Weaker Than East Bloc
by Pekka Haarla
Soviet General Kozlov Responds
- Defense Ministry Adviser Seeks To Calm Cruise Missile Debate
(Timo Lipponen; UUSI SUOMI, 28 Dec 83) 5

POLITICAL

DENMARK

- Many in Progressive Party Angered Over Glistrup Antics
(AKTUELT, 12 Jan; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 16, 18, 20 Jan 84) ... 10
- Folketing Leader Defies Schluter
by Ole Lorenzen
Party Conflict After Prison Escape Attempt
by Anders Wiig
Awaiting Schluter Move
by Michael Ehrenreich
Political Spokesman Attacks Glistrup
Folketing Chief Hits Glistrup
by Solveig Rodsgaard
- Election Recounts Completed; Majority Still Eludes Coalition
(BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 13, 15, 17 Jan 84; 19 Jan 84) 16
- Narrow Liberal Loss Decisive
by Michael Ehrenreich
New Folketing: More Women, Fewer Workers
by Jens J. Krogh

SDP Euromissile Dissident Reelected
Final Election Results Issued

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Bastian's Attack Rocks Green Bundestag Caucus (Various sources; 13, 17 Jan 84)	20
Anti-Americanism, Utopianism Charged by Udo Bergdoll Ehmke Supports Bastian's Position Greens Set 1984 Goals by Horst Schreitter-Schwarzenfeld Green 'Molting Process' by Jochen Siemens	
SDP Confronted by 'Basic Values,' Security Policy Issues (DIE WELT, 19 Jan 84; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 12 Jan 84)	24
New 'Godesberg Platform' Sought by Peter Philipps Security Policy in Disorder by Helmut Herles	

FRANCE

Franco-Soviet Relations Under Mitterrand Examined (Thomas Schreiber; NOTES ET ETUDES DOCUMENTAIRES, Nos 437- 438, 1983)	28
---	----

GREECE

Background on PASOK Youth Leadership (I. Theofylaktos; TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS, 1 Jan 84)	38
Government Denies Shifting to Centrist Position (I KATHIMERINI, 19 Jan 84)	40
Internal ND Youth Purges, More Expected (I KATHIMERINI, 24 Dec 83, 17 Jan 84)	42

PORTUGAL

Evolution of PS/PSD 'Center Bloc' Strategy (Teresa de Sousa; EXPRESSO, 24 Dec 83)	44
Membership of New PCP Central Committee (AVANTE, 22 Dec 83)	49

SPAIN

Iglesias on Operative Results of Recent PCE Congress (Gerardo Iglesias Interview; MUNDO OBRERO, 6-12 Jan 84)	57
Overview of Pre-election Basque Political Landscape (DIARIO 16, 10 Jan 84)	61
PSOE Federal Committee Focuses on Regional Elections (F. L. de Pablo; YA, 16 Jan 84)	64
Political Overview of Upcoming Catalan Elections (ABC, 16 Jan 84)	66

MILITARY

BELGIUM

Delays in Purchase of 2,500 Jeeps for Army (Michel Mathot; LA LIBRE BELGIQUE, 17 Jan 84)	68
---	----

ECONOMIC

NETHERLANDS

Economic Upturn Expected for 1984 (ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, 21 Jan 84)	74
--	----

PORTUGAL

Background of Investigation Into Sadolhao Cooperative (Joaquim Vieira; EXPRESSO, 24 Dec 83)	77
--	----

ENERGY

FRANCE

New Drilling, Oil Production Research Center Opens (AFP SCIENCES, No 383, 22 Dec 83)	80
---	----

ITALY

National Campaign for Solar Collector Systems (ENERGIE ALTERNATIVE HTE, Sep-Oct 83)	83
--	----

SOVIET GENERAL RESPONDS TO ARTICLE ON WARSAW PACT ARMS LEAD

NATO Weaker Than East Bloc

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 19 Dec 83 p 20

[Commentary by Pekka Haarla: "Soviet Union Has Superiority"]

[Text] The public at large has been fed reading material almost up to its ears on missile negotiations at various stages that have now been either interrupted or broken off. In the course of these articles the most widely differing sorts of comparative tables have been presented and nuclear warheads, nuclear missiles, launching pads, etc. have been discussed. On both sides it is claimed that the other party is striving for superiority in nuclear weapons. It is difficult for the ordinary citizen to follow these figures and even the experts entertain different opinions about them.

The public at large has been the object of a propaganda war between the two sides. More and more often it has had to form its views of the world situation according to the colored image provided by the news media. On the basis of that image a sizable number of people are of the opinion that the United States is the instigator of the current arms race and that President Reagan is a big warmonger.

Missiles Requested of the United States

There is good reason to look into these claims to see to what extent they are based on the truth. It is presented as a fact that the Americans are bringing new midrange missiles to Europe and that statement is then taken to be enough of a justification. Then one forgets that these missiles are by no means being brought to Europe on President Reagan's initiative, rather on the basis of West German Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt's proposal that they be used as a counterbalance to the new Warsaw Pact SS-20 missiles, since he no longer placed any faith in American missiles deployed in the United States.

Right from the start President Reagan would have preferred to install the new missiles in submarines patrolling European coastal waters, but the European NATO countries again expressed their doubt that they would remain in European waters and demanded that the missiles be located on their own soil.

That being the case, President Reagan cannot be accused of having absolutely insisted on bringing the midrange missiles to the European mainland. In fact he has constantly emphasized his desire to eliminate all midrange missiles and is constantly prepared to do so.

It is true that President Reagan has increased U.S. arms expenditures. But that does not necessarily make him a warmonger, as the below-cited figures show.

A comparison of nuclear weapons is Greek to a layman, but tanks, artillery and airplanes are concrete concepts to everyone. Only they have been relegated to second place in the fuss over nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it is more than likely that just these weapons will be used as a means of applying political pressure in settling differences or as the arsenal by means of which matters will be resolved in the field.

Soviet Union Has Superiority

If we examine the balance of power between the different parties in the domain of conventional weaponry, a study conducted by the NATO general staff certainly gives a clear reply to President Reagan's interest in increasing arms expenditures.

The figures cited below refer to arms now present in Europe. The wedge between the military alliances is merely growing while the Warsaw Pact nations have stepped up the manufacture of tanks this year. Examining the figures, there is perhaps reason to bear in mind that tanks [literally: armored cars] used to be called "assault cars," a designation that was later euphemized to its present form.

President Reagan is responsible for the commitments the United States makes within NATO. In light of the figures presented here, it is obvious that it is the obligation of every nation's head man to concern himself with his own country and its allies' security. President Reagan has by no means acted as a warmonger in increasing arms expenditures; rather he has tried to compensate for an imbalance that arose for reasons independent of him.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>	<u>NATO</u>
Men under arms	4,000,000	2,600,000
Tanks	42,500	13,000
Tactical aircraft	6,340	2,975
Armored vehicles	78,800	30,000
Artillery	31,500	10,750
Helicopters	1,800	1,000

Soviet General Kozlov Responds

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 28 Dec 83 p 12

[Letter to the editor by Svyatoslav Kozlov, Major General, Ret.: "Warsaw Pact and NATO Almost in Balance"]

[Text] Pekka Haarla's article, "The Soviet Union Has Superiority," was published in the 19 July edition of your newspaper.

In his article the author says that the public is now fed up with the extensive reports on missiles and that the wealth of statistics employed only keeps the ordinary reader from forming his own opinion on the subject.

Mr Haarla has, however, overcome his exasperation and decided to help the exhausted reader to get to the heart of the matter. As is apparent from the content of the article, he has set himself the thankless task of proving that President Reagan is not "a big warmonger" because American missiles are by no means being deployed in Europe on his initiative.

However, the widespread international discussion, the subject of which is the present occupant of the White House's actions leading to a direct increase in the danger of war, is not only due to the deployment of the new American missiles, although that is the number-one danger for Europe. Just by assessing U.S. policy in Latin America, Africa, the Near East and India and the Pacific, we get a convincing confirmation of where the threat of war is really coming from.

Reagan Ready to Destroy Soviet Weapons

Let it be said of the Euromissiles that Reagan intensified the development of dangerous new weapons which had been begun before his time, went ahead and deployed them and in that way broke off negotiations on arms reduction. They really began to develop these weapons in the United States as early as the start of the 1970's. And that by no means happened at NATO members' request, but as a Pentagon project, since the Pentagon felt that the new weapons would be useful for its preemptive strike attack strategy. At that time there were no Soviet SS-20 missiles at all, so that the new American missiles could in no way have been in response to them.

On the other hand, as far as the U.S. President's presumably constant hope of eliminating all midrange missiles is concerned, the hypocritical statements issued on the matter cannot conceal the fact that Reagan is ready to primarily get rid of the Soviet Union's land-based missiles belonging to this class, but he wants to leave intact missiles of the same class deployed elsewhere and France and England's missiles, which together would guarantee NATO a big lead over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations.

The author of the article nevertheless felt it necessary to corroborate his attempt to restore Reagan's honor with figures to show that, as regards the Warsaw Pact, the supposedly preponderant imbalance justifies the increase in NATO military strength.

Statistics Unfounded

I don't know what sources Haarla used, but the figures he cited have nothing to do with the truth. Their purpose is once again to mislead his readers.

For example, he claims that NATO has a total of 2.6 million men and the Warsaw Pact 4 million. According to data given in the pamphlet, "How to Eliminate the Threat to Europe" (Moscow 1983), there are 4.998 million men in NATO's regular armed forces and 4.821 million in the Warsaw Pact's. If we are talking only about ground forces, their respective strengths are 2.7 and 2.618 million men.

To demonstrate Warsaw Pact superiority in armor, Haarla includes all the tanks of the Warsaw Pact nations, but for NATO only those stationed in Europe, whereby he arrives at a figure of 13,000, although in fact there are over 17,000, in addition to which there are 8,000 in storage. Employing the same principle, he reports a "superiority" in terms of air strength. With regard to NATO, for example, he does not take into account carrier-based air strength, in which NATO has an undeniable lead. Thus the NATO fleet has 26 aircraft carriers and other ships equipped with air-combat weapons, and over 1,200 aircraft on these. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has no aircraft carriers at all and only two ships equipped with air-combat weapons.

So what is the result? It seems to me that Mr Haarla has not succeeded in demonstrating "Soviet superiority" with the aid of NATO and, especially, has not justified the United States' militaristic policy of increased arms expenditures. An objective comparison of the data on Warsaw Pact and NATO air strength and weapons shows that the two alliances are almost in balance. The Soviet Union has no intention of upsetting that balance, but it will not permit the other party to upset it either.

11,466
CSO: 3617/70

DEFENSE MINISTRY ADVISER SEEKS TO CALM CRUISE MISSILE DEBATE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 28 Dec 83 p 6

[Article by Timo Lipponen: "Pauli Jarvenpaa Is Amazed at Those Who Pointlessly Disseminate Hysteria; Finland Is Not Threatened by a Nuclear Catastrophe"]

[Text] Defense Ministry special investigator Pauli Jarvenpaa wonders why people are being more and more frantically frightened with the specter of nuclear weapons.

"Viewed with cold realism, the world is now much safer than in the early 1960's.

"In those days the total nuclear megatonnage was twice as much as it is now. Disseminators of nuclear hysteria lack historical perspective," Pauli Jarvenpaa charged.

In his opinion, Prof Raimo Vayrynen and first secretary Jorma Hentila are wrong when they claim that a nuclear catastrophe would take Finland by surprise too if a crisis should break out in Europe.

"I often wonder why the threat is painted so black," Jarvenpaa went on.

"They complain about the constant increase in the number of nuclear weapons, yet there is no evidence that this is true. In addition to the fact that in the early 1960's there was twice as much megatonnage, there was also a greater number of nuclear warheads and carriers at that time. Furthermore, the weapons could not be guided as accurately as now and were thus not as safe.

"The West's cruise missiles and the Soviet SS-20 missiles, which now produce shudders of horror, are safer," Jarvenpaa explained.

Arms Preserve Peace

Jarvenpaa regards television, which with its technology can easily influence people, as being one of the main factors responsible for this hysteria.

In his opinion, television has served as an effective means for spreading the view that a war engaged in with nuclear weapons is in particular the only kind of crisis that would be possible in the Nordic countries too.

Jarvenpaa said that he has employed the same arguments as SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] first secretary Jorma Hentila and Prof Raimo Vayrynen, who sits on the Defense Committee with a mandate from the SDP [Social Democratic Party].

An increase in tension in the situation in the Nordic countries in the form of military activism, however, influences matters in just the opposite direction:

"In a way we are lucky that the arms situation is what it is," Jarvenpaa deliberately provoked us, but he at the same time assured us that our awareness of [the consequences of] upsetting the balance serves as a brake.

Analysts' Conflict

Pauli Jarvenpaa has publicly announced that he represents "a realistic school of thought that is less fashionable than the current one."

He admits that there is a conflict between peace analysts and strategy analysts, even though it is not evident in their personal relations.

"Peace analysts react rather indifferently, even overcritically, to national defense," Jarvenpaa noted.

In his opinion, the Tampere Peace Research Institute, headed by Tapio Varis, is not interested in military topics, an attitude that is not evident at foreign peace research institutes. "There may be individuals at these institutes who are familiar with military affairs," Jarvenpaa remarked.

He cited the Stockholm institute, SIPRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute], at which investigators who have acquired military experience work.

Soviet Union Guilty Too

Investigator Pauli Jarvenpaa is annoyed by the slanted versions of the international political situation that are instilled in people's minds.

One myth he would like to destroy is that the United States is alone responsible for the arms race. To get an overall picture, we ought to remember that there is another side too.

"The Soviet Union was the first to develop the intercontinental missile and the killer satellite and simultaneously with the United States the hydrogen bomb and the strategic submarine," Jarvenpaa explained.

According to him, there is a misconception regarding a limited nuclear war.

"I don't believe that Ronald Reagan wants to get involved in such a war.

"The talk about a limited nuclear war primarily means using conventional weapons to prevent a war.

"When they say that they will use nuclear weapons if necessary, they mean raising the threshold of war by using conventional weapons; they wouldn't dare go for their rifles," Jarvenpaa said.

"They Won't Get Involved in a Nuclear Weapon Poker Game"

According to him, the United States is politically driving itself into a corner with President Reagan's speech referring to the Soviet Union as an "evil empire."

However, the situation is not worth making speeches about; in spite of their tough speeches the superpowers won't get involved in a nuclear weapon poker game, as Jarvenpaa puts it. And this notwithstanding the fact that the disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have been broken off.

"What is at issue is a political game in which both sides are renewing their equipment. They are now shifting to new classifications in the field of nuclear weapons.

"With the breaking off of negotiations the Soviet Union is now racking up political points. I nevertheless believe that the foaming at the mouth will quiet down over the next few years, apparently after the U.S. presidential election, in the spring of 1985," Pauli Jarvenpaa felt.

Negative Lotto Victory

We must learn to live with the growing military significance of the Nordic countries. Jarvenpaa feels that this will be a permanent and complicated problem.

"The Soviet Union has real access to open waters in Europe only from Murmansk. This is a negative lotto victory for the Nordic countries," he said.

"The Soviet Union's northern fleet has greatly increased in size. Two-thirds of its strategic naval striking power is precisely in the Murmansk area," investigator Jarvenpaa went on.

He feels that this is a natural consequence of the fact that Norway has become NATO's communications link. U.S. AWACS radar planes make routine flights in Norway and, furthermore, there are listening networks to detect submarines between Norway and Spitsbergen. What is important, however, is the fact that the Soviet Union and NATO have not made any more aggressive gestures than these in the area.

According to Jarvenpaa, the recently "revealed" military agreement between the United States and Norway that has been reported has merely added to Norway's readiness to accept NATO aid.

Crisis in Our Own Territory

The Finnish Armed Forces are capable of combatting any crisis that in Jarvenpaa's opinion always turns out to be the same "no matter which part of the jigsaw puzzle we start from to put it together."

Finland's reserves are adequate for the more likely threat scenario or situation in which we are no longer at peace but war properly speaking has not broken out either.

"That sort of situation is challenging for us. In a situation of ever-growing tension we must remain outside of any crisis.

"Finland must be capable of keeping the situation firmly in its own hands. No one must be permitted to believe that Finland can be made to play into the hands of one or the other party to the affair," Jarvenpaa reminded us.

In the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact the Soviet Union is assured that it need not fear that Finland may serve as a bridgehead for an attack on it. Jarvenpaa admitted that more problematic at the present time is the question of getting the West to believe that Finland is not playing its hand for the benefit of the Soviet Union, but that it remains neutral, which is in keeping with everyone's security interests.

"Finland Is in No Hurry to Go to War"

In Jarvenpaa's opinion, military consultations in accordance with the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact should be postponed as long as possible; they should not be engaged in until help is really needed. "Finland should have no reason to be in a hurry to join in a war," Jarvenpaa argued.

It is in keeping with the Soviet Union's interests for Finland to look after its own piece of land. Jarvenpaa noted that in a crisis situation the Soviet Union would have more important places to worry about than Finland.

"In the other Nordic countries they closely study the way in which Finnish-Soviet consultations are conducted; it is a signal of Soviet reactions.

"Contacts need not be dramatic in appearance like that of 1961 either. Even mere rumors sensitize the other Nordic countries," Jarvenpaa said.

President Urho Kekkonen too justified his 1961 request addressed to the Soviet Union to cancel the consultations on the grounds that they might result in countermeasures in the other Nordic countries.

Misleading Reports on the New Missiles

In Pauli Jarvenpaa's opinion, the cruise missile issue is one of those that has been badly "removed from its context."

"The threat to neutral countries has existed before too.

"It's inconceivable that a manned fighter plane could be less of a threat than a passive cruise missile that is following the terrain. Among other things, a fighter pilot producing false patterns is an unquestionably more difficult target than a cruise missile," Jarvenpaa asserted.

So the problem has existed for a long time now. According to Jarvenpaa, the cruise missile is a "political response" to the Soviet SS-20 missile.

In Jarvenpaa's opinion, there have been inaccurate reports on the targets of the ground-launched cruise missiles that have already been deployed. It is pointless to maintain that they would be directed against Murmansk when "there are more suitable targets in the Eastern European countries and the western parts of the Soviet Union."

He did not dispute the possibility that in that sort of hypothetical situation the missiles might take advantage of the air space of Finland's southern coast, but he did point to Western plans not to take advantage of neutral countries, at least not during the initial phase, nor to use them as missile targets.

New Missiles Already in Use

Cruise missiles installed in aircraft and submarines, which are classified as most troublesome from the standpoint of Finland's neutrality, are in use, although they are in public spoken of as weapons of the future. However, there are none in Europe.

"They have already mounted several hundred cruise missiles on B-52 bombers, in about five squadrons. They make routine flights from the United States to the polar region.

"Furthermore, there are already cruise missiles in Sturgeon and Los Angeles-class submarines," Jarvenpaa explained.

If a real nuclear conflict were, however, to begin, in Jarvenpaa's opinion we should not expect too much of Finland's neutrality. Not even a Nordic nuclear-free zone will help then; it will not provide a "cheese-dish cover" over the Nordic countries if there are nuclear weapons within flying range.

11,466
CSO: 3617/70

MANY IN PROGRESSIVE PARTY ANGERED OVER GLISTRUP ANTICS

Folketing Leader Defies Schluter

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 12 Jan 84 p 23

[Article by Ole Lorenzen]

[Text] The nonsocialist government should not expect any help from the Progressive Party in solving parliamentary problems.

Even though the election dealt the party a frightful blow, there are no indications that the six remaining Progressives will reduce their demands. On the contrary, as far as we can tell, the election results will lead to an intensification of the party's course.

For it was largely the Folketing members most willing to negotiate who lost their seats. The six who are left want to pursue a pure Progressive policy. And a pure Progressive policy means big public savings and tax relief--regardless of the consequences.

As group chairman Helge Dohrmann--who insured his own re-election--put it:

"The voters who voted for us in spite of everything did not elect us to let the government continue on the course it has been pursuing.

"If the government simply presents its budget once more, we will vote no again. We are not sticking blindly to a particular figure, but we must still start out on page 1 of the budget bill and big savings cuts and tax relief measures must be implemented," Dohrmann added.

He is unconcerned about the risk that this will force the government into the arms of the Social Democrats:

"That is up to the government to decide. They can choose the people they want to cooperate with and thus which policy they want to pursue."

The group chairman takes a brighter view of things now that the election results have had time to sink in.

"Even though we have lost 10 seats, our political influence remains the same. The government must either use us or the Social Democrats to form a majority. I feel that gives us a very strong position. We must look ahead and try to make a comeback in the next election.

"With the present makeup of the Folketing group, there will be no more personal bickering. Now we can concentrate on forming policy," Helge Dohrmann said.

Party Conflict After Prison Escape Attempt

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Anders Wiig]

[Text] The police have now received two formal complaints in connection with the detention of Glistrup, whose party colleagues and partisans have attacked the party chairman and accused him of lying.

In the wake of the election and two police complaints following Mogens Glistrup's forcible detention in Horserod Prison's isolation cell, prominent Progressives are now fighting tooth and nail. While Glistrup calls his guards and their superiors assailants and traitors, his party colleagues are using terms like horrible, shocking and incomprehensible about their national chairman, V. A. Jakobsen.

Over the weekend, police in Helsingor received complaints first from the Progressive Party's Helsingor district and later from Glistrup himself. The latter was delivered by his son, accountant Jorgen Glistrup, and barrister Palle Tillisch. The latter, who is close to Glistrup politically and personally, is former chairman of the party and he has also been chairman of the party's Folketing group.

Mogens Glistrup is accusing nine prison employees of high treason and assault when they forcibly detained him on Thursday and put him in an isolation cell. He claims he was a member of Folketing from the minute the election was over and that he is covered by immunity since there can be no doubt about his election. He refuses to wait until "it might suit the government's minister of internal affairs to send out a so-called election return notice."

Glistrup is also calling for charges of high treason against those who gave the order for his detention and thus violated Paragraph 34 of the constitution.

On Friday, national chairman V. A. Jakobsen returned from a visit with Glistrup in Horserod and announced that Glistrup denied the charges of

assault. On Saturday, Palle Tillisch and Jorgen Glistrup visited the prisoner and later Tillisch said to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE:

"That is wrong. The complaints are based on both Paragraph 34 of the constitution and the use of force by employees of the state prison. It is horrible that V. A. Jakobsen says something different. Fellow prisoners confirm that violence was used and that was the reason for their strike. It surprises me that our national chairman feels called on to play down this aspect of Mogens Glistrup's charges."

Party vice chairman Poul Sustmann Hansen disagreed sharply with his national chairman.

A public statement included the following:

"V. A. Jakobsen has deliberately misled the public by suppressing the truth about the use of physical violence."

The statement charges that Jakobsen learned first-hand from Glistrup that the reports from the other prisoners were correct. Jakobsen brought Glistrup's handwritten draft of the charges out of the prison and it contained the statement that "three prison guards used excessive physical violence."

Sustmann Hansen called it "shocking and incomprehensible...that V. A. Jakobsen felt it necessary to provide such misleading information about what actually happened."

He expects the national chairman to summon the executive committee to a meeting soon after the election.

If not, he will discuss the possibility with Lene and Mogens Glistrup of doing so himself and putting the Horserod affair on the agenda.

Sustmann Hansen: I have no idea whose game the national chairman was playing in this matter.

"Something is terribly wrong. I have the clear impression that he was trying to hush this up."

Awaiting Schluter Move

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Michael Ehrenreich]

[Text] The government should not expect any clear information on the Progressive Party's position in the forthcoming negotiations on the budget today, following a meeting of the Z [Progressive] group.

"In the first place, we were hardly at full strength today," said group chairman Helge Dohrmann. "In the second place, in our view the ball is now in the government's court. We would like to have a long-term agreement with the government, but we do not yet know if it will yield to the Social Democrats or come to us. My recommendation to the group today will be that we should wait until we hear from the government." He added that although they do not expect this, they would naturally react to an immediate invitation from the government to negotiate, "but in that case we would make it clear that we have not had an opportunity to discuss the situation as a group."

Political Spokesman Attacks Glistrup

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Jan 84 p 3

[Text] The founder of the Progressive Party, Mogens Glistrup, who yesterday resumed his work in the party's Folketing group, is now being sharply criticized by the political spokesman of the party, Ole Maisted, who beat Glistrup's faithful follower, Mogens Voigt, in the election in Fyn.

Ole Maisted says that "Glistrup obviously believes that the party is him and he is the party." Ole Maisted adds that politically he is in full agreement with Mogens Glistrup and that the entire Glistrup case and sentence showed that the tax laws should be revised. He also says that he fully agrees that immediately after the election Mogens Glistrup should have been released from Horserod.

"Politically we agree. But I do not agree with the personality cult that exists and I am dissatisfied with Glistrup's statements about who are the true Progressives," Ole Maisted said to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

Folketing Chief Hits Glistrup

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 20 Jan 84 p 1

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard]

[Text] Group chairman Helge Dohrmann says that it is the Folketing group that sets the Progressive Party line and not Mogens Glistrup from Horserod. And he takes it calmly that Progressives in southern Jutland have left the party.

The Progressive Party's political line and Mogens Glistrup's self-centered attitude have created unrest among Progressives in southern Jutland, which is group chairman Helge Dohrmann's political base.

Several prominent Progressives have left the party, but Helge Dohrmann is taking this calmly. He also insisted that it is the Folketing group alone that sets the political line. It is not set by Mogens Glistrup in Horserod.

Negative Policy Must Go

Among the defectors in southern Jutland is the chairman of the party's county organization, Niels Oluf Petersen of Vojens. He criticized the Progressive Party's negative policy and said that the party cannot survive if it keeps going that way.

Another defector is Haderslev city council member Valborg Outzen who is opposed to "Glistrup's happenings in the press." She added that it is not the job of a political party to support a man "who uses the party solely to get his personal revenge on society."

Sad

Helge Dohrmann said of Niels Oluf Petersen that the county committee and the executive committee had asked him to meet with them for the purpose of requesting his resignation. But Niels Oluf Petersen anticipated them and left of his own accord. However Helge Dohrmann regretted that Valborg Outzen had left the party.

Helge Dohrmann said of the criticism of Glistrup that many Progressive Party members find Glistrup personally and the Glistrup case as such sad because it is his personality that is discussed rather than the policies of the party.

"But the decisive thing is that when Glistrup is locked in at Horserod, it cuts him off from exerting the same influence on Folketing policy that he would if he were there in person. So the remarks that we are directed from Horserod are pure nonsense."

Does that mean he is looking forward to having Glistrup expelled from Folketing again?

"No, now that the voters voted Glistrup in, I would rather see him retain his seat. But we all know what will happen--he will be thrown out on Wednesday. And then it will simply be the people in the Folketing group who will decide policy."

Will there be a calmer atmosphere around the party's policy and the party line when he is out of the picture?

"There is no disagreement on the party line. And now too when Glistrup is sitting here we all agree that it would be beneficial, especially for the country, if we reached an agreement with the government parties and the Radical Liberals on something that could extend several years into the future."

"I really think it is a poor excuse from those who are now saying something. It is all right to leave the party. But to say that Glistrup has such an enormous influence is wrong."

Does Dohrmann think Glistrup himself would agree with that?

"You would have to ask him about that. Glistrup has always had only one vote when we voted in the group. Although of course it is correct that due to his knowledge he has had more influence than many others. Also because he always knows what he is talking about. But I would like to repeat that it is the Folketing group that will be conducting policy.

Glistrup's Solo Run

"Do I myself think Glistrup is running a solo race? Glistrup has never held back when he had an opportunity to speak out in public. But the decisive thing for me is that Glistrup was elected to Folketing. The voters chose him and since this is a very special case, it is not surprising that there is great public interest in it. But I would not dream of starting to criticize Glistrup for fighting to keep the seat entrusted to him by the voters."

6578

CSO: 3613/85

ELECTION RECOUNTS COMPLETED; MAJORITY STILL ELUDES COALITION

Narrow Liberal Loss Decisive

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Jan 84 p 3

[Article by Michael Ehrenreich]

[Excerpt] Inger Harms of SF (Socialist People's Party) will retain her seat. This means that the government will not control the 90 seats needed to form a majority in critical votes, together with the Radical Liberal Party and three of the North Atlantic representatives.

In all probability, the Socialist People's Party will win the race with the Liberal Party for the seat in parliament that has been up in the air during the entire recount, which began after the elections on Tuesday.

Only 57 votes, in favor of SF, separated the two parties when Danmarks Statistik and the Interior Ministry began the final tally last night.

This means that Inger Harms of SF will retain her seat in parliament, which is an at-large seat, representing Sonderjylland County. Otherwise, the seat would have gone to Birthe Ronn Hornbech of Roskilde County (Liberal Party).

As a result, both the Liberal Party and SF will control 21 seats in the new parliament.

The probable outcome of the final recount will mean that the government will be unable to obtain a majority in parliament on critical votes with the Radicals and three of the North Atlantic representatives. If the seat in question had gone to the Liberals, the nonsocialist government could have achieved control over 90 seats (and thus a majority in parliament) with the help of the two Faroe Islands seats and Greenlander Otto Steenholdt.

The exciting finish between SF and the Liberals was similar to the outcome of the 1981 elections, in which Inger Harms of Sonderjylland County defeated Peter Brixtofte of Vejle County only after several days of recounts.

New Folketing: More Women, Fewer Workers

Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 19 Jan 84 p 15

[Article by Jens J. Krogh]

[Text] The new parliament, which will meet for the first time on Tuesday, will have 45 women as representatives.

Even though it is a long way up to 89, i.e. half the seats in parliament, women have never been so well represented in parliament before. The final recount of the votes has given several more seats to women. The most recent one was Ruth Olsen (SF) who took Holger K. Nielsen's seat in Copenhagen County.

In more precise figures, 25.1 percent of the representatives will be women on 24 January and this figure could rise the very next day to 25.7 percent. This is because Mogens Glistrup is expected to be voted out of parliament and his replacement will be Pia Kjaersgaard, who is the top FRP (Progressive Party) alternate in Copenhagen County.

Still In Last Place

As of now, the number of women representatives has risen from 42 in the last elections to 45. In terms of percentages, the rise is from 23.5 to 25.1 percent. Even though the increase is proceeding relatively slowly, there have never been as many women in parliament as there are now.

Nevertheless, Denmark still is in last place among the Nordic countries when it comes to women in parliament. In the other Nordic countries, women have a somewhat higher percentage of the seats and, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Finland is in first place with 31 percent. That may also be a world record.

Among the Danish parties, SF has the greatest representation of women with nine out of 21 seats, which corresponds to 42.9 percent. The Progressive Party is in last place, without a single woman representative in parliament. The top alternate is a woman, however.

Tremendous Distortion

Although the representation of women in parliament has improved somewhat, there is an even greater distortion in the occupational categories of the new representatives than there was before.

The new parliament is characterized by job titles such as lawyer, political scientist, farm owner, teacher, and journalist.

Only 10 percent, 18 members to be exact, of the new parliament are from LO (Federation of Trade Unions). To reach even this low figure, it is necessary to include former laborer Anker Jorgensen and former gardener Jens Risgaard Knudsen. Considering that LO has more than 1.3 million members, this reflects a

definite distortion of the picture.

L0 members are best represented in the Social Democratic Party, while neither the Conservative Party nor the Liberal Party can point to a single representative with an L0 background.

Presidents' Party

The Conservative Party, which during the election campaign stressed that it was a party of the wage earners as well, now has 42 members of parliament including six company presidents, six lawyers, four farm owners, and eight representatives of the educational system--from elementary school teachers to a professor at the University of Copenhagen. But the Conservative group does not include a single worker.

SF now has fewer wage earners--two from L0 and seaman Tommy Dinesen. The situation improved somewhat for VS (Left Socialist Party), since two new HK (Union of Retail Business and Clerical Workers) members are included in its five-member group.

Loss For Workers

It is necessary to look far back in history to find a parliament with so few representatives of the workers.

The last parliamentary elections were bad enough, but this year's elections represented a further decline. In the newly elected parliament only five (three Social Democrats and two VS members) of the 53 first-time members are from the L0 sector. In addition, nine L0 representatives are leaving parliament and two police inspectors failed to be reelected.

A sharp rise in the number of public employees who are members of the new parliament also may be noted. The public employees have increased their representation in parliament by almost a dozen. Obviously, this has occurred at the expense of members with a background in independent business or as employees in the private sector.

Older On Average

The new parliament also broke with a tradition in recent elections.

The average age of members in the new parliament is higher than it was after the 1981 elections. At that time, the average age was 46.9 years. Now it has risen to 47.2 years. But the Christian People's Party (KRF) still has the oldest members and the Left Socialist Party still has the youngest. The average age of KRF members is 52 years, while for VS members of parliament the average is 32.4 years.

SDP Euromissile Dissident Reelected

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Jan 84 p 7

[Article: "More Votes for Robert Pedersen"]

[Text] Social Democratic member of parliament Robert Pedersen received more votes in the latest parliamentary elections than in the 1981 elections--7,639 compared to 6,759 in 1981.

This occurred even though a local voter group opposed his candidacy. The reason for this was Robert Pedersen's dissenting views on the missile issue.

Final Election Results Issued

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Jan 84 p 6

[Article: "The Final Election Results"]

[Text]

Party	Votes	District Seats	At-Large	Total
Social Democrats	1,082,692	51	6	57
Radicals	184,634	3	7	10
Conservatives	788,225	40	2	42
Justice Party	50,370	0	0	0
SF	387,115	16	5	21
Socialist Workers Party	2,147	0	0	0
Communist Party	23,086	0	0	0
Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)	975	0	0	0
Center Democratic Party	154,557	3	5	8
KRF	91,633	1	4	5
Liberal Party	405,722	20	1	21
VS	89,359	0	5	5
FRP	120,631	1	5	6
Independents	956	0	0	0

There were 3,829,600 qualified voters for the parliamentary elections on 10 January 1984. A total of 3,386,823 of this number actually voted, which corresponds to 88.4 percent. A total of 19,749 blank ballots were cast, while 4,972 ballots were declared invalid for other reasons.

9336

CSO: 3613/83

BASTIAN'S ATTACK ROCKS GREEN BUNDESTAG CAUCUS

Anti-Americanism, Utopianism Charged

Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 13 Jan 84 p 3

[Article by Udo Bergdoll]

[Excerpts] The opening of the closed session comes like a shock, against all plans, against every agenda. Not the party spokesmen, Otto Schily, Marie-luise Beck-Oberdorf, or Petra Kelly, but Gert Bastian does the talking. The former Bundeswehr tank general paints so somber a picture of the situation of the Greens as hardly any outsider could have imagined it. Now deputy Bastian-- in a resume of his devastating critique of the condition of the faction-- threatens to quit the Greens once again: "Unless the mess is eliminated, my preference will be in the future to devote my efforts in full, as an unaffiliated deputy, to those political goals of the Greens and the peace movement which got me my Bundestag candidacy in the first place, the reliable pursuit of which, however, prevailing conditions make impossible to our faction." What he presents orally the former general also has distributed by letter in full. A few of those in the know found the letter in their slots already the evening before.

The Faction Is Speechless

Press spokesman Heinz Suhr announces an explanation before they adjourned in failure. It expresses regret that "despite lengthy and intensive discussions" no agreement had been reached between Bastian and the faction.

Bastian's critique hits the Greens at a time when they do not know in which direction their young party is to proceed. The "unification party congress of the K sects, Sponti freaks, eco-freaks and feminists," as the Frankfurt deputy Joschka Fischer once called the faction, is in the midst of a fairly rough debate about its course. Apart from the issue if the Hessian Greens are to collaborate with the SPD, Bastian commented on all open and hidden problems.

Bastian speaks of the "start of a political misdirection" shown in the success by those Greens that came out of the Communist League. The "uncoordinated majority" was simply outvoted "by means of a shrewd and disciplined cadre tactics manipulation." That, so says the former general, paved the way for

political tendencies deviating from the policy platform of the Greens and "showing violence-oriented as well as strongly anti-American features."

Bastian comes right down to the point: His party colleague Juergen Reents had demanded in the December issue of KONKRET the West German peace movement should unequivocally maintain its anti-U.S. thrust. Anyone who were to ask for bloc-overlapping peace initiatives, an indignant Bastian said, would "find more sardonic criticism than solidary support." It was alarming that ever more blithely the attempt was being made to impose "on the Greens' policy, determined by the primacy of ecology and nonviolence, an accent oriented to obsolete ideas of class struggle."

The person so addressed, Juergen Reents, who had long belonged to the Communist League (KB) and, like Bastian, had chosen the peace policy for his major effort in party business, responded to his critic by saying he overrated the weight of the group that displeased him. He, Reents, after all were the only one in the Green's Bundestag faction who had come out of the Communist League. Then he accuses Bastian of having issued a "declaration of war to the party."

Bastian's next assault is aimed against the rotation principle. Ten months of parliamentary work had sufficiently proven that the working structure imposed on the faction was unsuitable and did not allow any efficient processing and coping with what was politically necessary. The model of an "office team" made up of current and future mandatories had proven a "hopelessly faulty design." Says Bastian: "Not performance improvement, but needless losses in performance are the result of that utopia."

Ehmke Supports Bastian's Position

West Berlin TAGESZEITUNG in German 19 Jan 84 p 4

[Excerpts] The Bundestag faction of the Greens, to settle the problems raised by its deputy Gert Bastian, has set up a task force that is to come up with propositions for resolving them by early February. A caucus meeting on 7 February is to discuss the propositions of the commission. Until then, Gert Bastian will abide by his threat to quit. The team, in addition to party spokeswoman Beck-Oberdorf, is made up by people such as deputies Hoss, Burgmann, Vogt and others who, it is being said, "can talk with Bastian." Bastian himself was included.

Deputy Wolfgang Ehmke, the party's economic expert, then said that his initiative, to form a party group to settle the party's problems on the basis of the Bastian paper, had thus become redundant. Last week Ehmke had announced he wanted to search, together with Bastian and others, for "new ways making for positive changes" because not only the faction but the whole party was facing a "tensile test in view of the situation in Hesse and elsewhere." Through a "personal announcement" Ehmke had concurred with much in Bastian's critique.

Ehmke also is against the rotation principle which, he thinks, is "paralyzing" and has led to "actionism and separatism." The work in the faction was "very laborious," he said; he had "imagined his work would be quite different."

Gerd Bastian himself told TAGESZEITUNG things had been wild at a local party meeting in Munich last Monday evening, but his critique had met with understanding. The majority, however, disapproved his taking his mandate along if he were to quit the faction. His colleague Petra Kelly said yesterday Bastian's problems were not "his problems alone." He should now be given time to talk with others. It was more a "human than a political problem," not last, due to the "soulless existence in Bonn." What mainly mattered was "to know politically what we want."

Greens Set 1984 Goals

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 19 Jan 84 p 4

[Article by Horst Schreitter-Schwarzenfeld]

[Excerpts] The Greens have postponed the "Bastian Topic" to later. First they want to talk thoroughly with their deputy who had threatened last week he would quit the faction and take his mandate along, unless consideration was given to his ideas, before they hold another caucus meeting on 7 February. Meanwhile they have nominated the former Bundeswehrgeneral Gert Bastian to be their representative in case a Bundestag investigating commission deals with the Kiessling case.

In a press conference that had first been scheduled for last week, but had not come off because of the upset over the Bastian letter, the Greens on Wednesday proposed their plans for working in the Bundestag in 1984. The focal point would be the subject of "environmental destruction," Marieluise Beck-Oberdorf said, who is a member of the tripartite council of spokesmen. The dying of the woods was linked with the death of men. That is why the energy policy should have to be changed--"whatever the costs." For that purpose, the Greens want to have many laws amended. E. g., there should be an end to giving discounts for massive consumption of energy.

As to economic policy, according to the Greens, alternative economies (economic systems not oriented to growth) should be encouraged. The Greens' foreign and defense policy, presented by deputy Petra Kelly, would promote relations, not so much with the "states" as with the "movements." That would also include contacts with the peace movements in the East Bloc. On the subject of alternate strategies (defense conceptions that might replace that of nuclear deterrence) the Greens announced they would hold their own hearings in Bonn, "counter-hearings," as Petra Kelly said, to the hearings of the Bundestag defense commission.

In domestic policy, according to Otto Schily, the Greens would come out against "Orwellian surveillance." They would reject the census and machine-controlled ID cards. They have a bill by which they seek the protection of foreigners. Other initiatives are supposed to deal with the deletion of Article 175 (homosexuality) from the Penal Code and with restitution for Sinti and Roma.

The Born faction has achieved unanimity about these legislative and political projects. Gert Bastian, as Schily asserted, had offered no contradiction to the

program. The coalition issue also should be discussed with an eye to the Hessian negotiations. But a discussion did not ensue. Schily said there was not enough time.

Green 'Molting Process'

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 17 Jan 84 p 1

[Article by Jochen Siemens]

[Excerpt] From the decision by the Hessian Greens to keep negotiating with the SPD in Wiesbaden, to get a minority Landtag government the Greens can tolerate, the Greens' Bundestag secretary Joschka Fischer expects "a very strong impact on the party." That decision had been a "decisive caesura" because now the possibility had "materialized" for a political say-so. Fischer did deny, however, any immediate effects on the Bundestag faction.

The Greens were now in a "molting process" in terms of their political office team structure and their rotation and their basic political trend. There were no alternatives now for their chance for coalition with the SPD. Going with the SPD would for the Greens, however, be a "forced alliance" since both were more and more contesting for identical constituencies. There were no alternatives for the "reformist course" now taken in Hesse, unless one wanted to take the Land over as a desert later on. The Hessian Greens had shown a "very strong stability," which would prevent an SPD departure.

5885

CSO: 3620/155

SPD CONFRONTED BY 'BASIC VALUES,' SECURITY POLICY ISSUES

New 'Godesberg Platform' Sought

Bonn DIE WELT in German 19 Jan 84 pp 1, 6

[Article by Peter Philipps]

[Text] Still in this decade the SPD is to adopt a new platform to replace the Godesberg one of 1959. That is the core sentence in an extensive report now completed by the party's platform commission. After being edited at Bonn's SPD headquarters, the paper, still treated as classified at this time, will become party executive business on 30 January. As the platform commission sees it, the May SPD Congress in Essen then will kick off an intra-party debate for several years about a new program.

The members of the commission, which includes politically so diverse social democrats as the two Berlin professors of political science, Richard Loewenthal and Gesine Schwan, Erhard Eppler, Peter von Oertzen, Johano Strasser, Hans Koschnik and Heinz Rapp, are asserting however that the platform decisions of Godesberg are not meant to be placed in doubt. That should also include the "basic value triad" (SPD Chairman Brandt) of liberty, justice and solidarity. But since many changes had taken place since 1959 which the progenitors of the Godesberg Program could not have predicted and false assessments and gaps are to be found, it would be advisable to draw up an entirely new program all of one piece.

Among the errors and omissions long deplored by parts of the SPD already the members of the platform commission also include the economy and ecology sectors and the foreign policy. Furthermore, e.g., much too optimistic a picture had been drawn in the Godesberg Program of science and research.

The platform commission is holding on to the Godesberg statement that "the SPD affirms the free market: Competition as much as possible--planning as much as necessary." But they demand statements on new ways to be sought due to altered structural conditions, including the realization of the ecological limits of growth. The objective is a socially and ecologically responsible economic order. The new platform should have to include tasks such as work for all, the humanization of the working environment and nurture of the natural resources. The

market's capacity and limits should have to be made as clear as the social democratic task to seek growth aimed at the quality of life selectively and accomplish a fair distribution of wealth.

The relationship with the trade unions and the common objectives such as the extension of parity codetermination and economic democracy are addressed as further points in the new program. Cutting back working hours is held up as a long-term goal; achieving it gradually would depend on economic development.

For the education and school sector the commission proposes to hold on, by and large, to the Godesberg Program directions, but to include in addition that schools should have to be concerned with the principle of encouragement instead of selection, culture be a word in its own right, and one goal in school education also would have to be the capability for criticism and dispute.

The program chapters on the Germany and foreign policy should refer to the Ostpolitik of the SPD/FDP coalition and introduce the north-south problems. The "international community" chapter in the Godesberg Program, they say, is as remote from today's reality as but few others. The reunification theme should have to take a backseat in the sequence of program statements. It should have to be made clear that reuniting the Germans is subordinate to peace. Altogether, that chapter, which also should have to contain an allegiance to the western community and the goal of a west-east security partnership, ought to be introduced by a pledge to peace.

In this field of foreign and security policy, the commission admitted, only a minimal consensus could be agreed upon. Whereas throughout the various sessions in the last 2 years no basic differences about the statements in the new program evolved over long stretches, this was something where the party debate of the past once again made itself fully felt. The platform commission therefore trusts that developments in years ahead also will help bring about a feasible compromise on that.

Security Policy in Disorder

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 12 Jan 84 p 10

[Article by Helmut Herles]

[Text] The loneliness of former Chancellor Schmidt in his defeat at the Cologne SPD Congress after his party escaped from its previous security policy may have been only a stopover. The last word has not been said about it yet in the SPD. The overwhelming new majority of the nay sayers to rearmament (only 14 congress delegates voted with Schmidt, and only 25 deputies of his faction took a position like his in the Bundestag rearmament debate) is divided into two main currents. One, which with Hans Apel firmly stands by NATO and the Bundeswehr, and the other ones who, a la Lafontaine, have long been toying with the next ideas, a "Gaullism from the left," of NATO skepticism and neutrality. In reading the first January edition of VORWAERTS one can sense the mentality in the authoritative and fashion-designing circles in the SPD. There they are repressing and forgetting the yea to the Bundeswehr and NATO in

the Cologne resolutions, much as the former yea from party chairman Brandt to the policy. His successor Schmidt had only been lip-service, so he says himself, for a notion of keeping in power. Brandt's heart had long been beating for Lafontaine, Eppler or Bahr.

That fight is one the SPD will still have to engage in. That it is going to give up, just as dramatically, and in spite of the first signs of alarm, its arduously accomplished pledges to NATO and the Bundeswehr is unlikely. Should that fight break out in the future, above and beyond the currently consenting nay sayers, there would again become apparent all the oppositional trends, the parties within the party. That was already the case in the Bundestag rearmament debate when quite a few of them explained their nay by saying that it might later still turn into a yea to preserving the military balance as a guarantee for peace.

This now diminished group that is holding on to Schmidt's government policy has not been shut up, has only in part entered an "internal emigration." Even party resignations seem to be limited, apart from the spectacular events in Berlin and the devastating impression the party congress has left on social democratic members of the Bundeswehr. Advisors to the former SPD/FDP federal government, professors and trade unionists like Karl Kaiser and Horst Niggemeier, intend to write a book about their experiences in the effort to stay Schmidt's course. They do not want to act as if nothing has happened.

This issue-taking is also served by a documentation on the reflection of the internal SPD debate in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, the central organ of the SED in the GDR. Manfred Wilke's study for an information service of the Wiesbaden publishing house, "Das junge Wort," has been noted with attention in these circles of friends in the SPD and the trade unions. Wilke has documented the period between June and November 1983. In it he takes issue with the SED's contest for West German hearts and minds. The West and the SPD had picked up all too blithely Honecker's saying that never again must war emanate from German soil. "A different demand would perhaps be more important: no war must occur on German soil." Wilke demands of the SPD it should never forget events of contemporary history: Twice already military interventions have taken place since 1945 on the German soil of the GDR, on 17 June 1953, after the SED called for help, when the Soviet army took on striking workers, and externally, when the "National People's Army" of the GDR took part in the occupation of the CSSR by Warsaw Pact troops on 21 August 1968.

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND could show the SPD leadership how much mileage GDR propaganda had gotten out of the disputes in the SPD and its change of course. To the SED, language was a "power interpretation of reality." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND had primarily disseminated those reports from the SPD that met with the twelfth of 53 SED Central Committee slogans for 1 May 1983: "1983 must not become the year of deploying new U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe." Biased, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND had reported only the positions of those SPD politicians and splinter groups that "confirm this political demand by the SED leadership." "At all that, the social democrats concerned can look up the columns of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and find out how their opinion on disarmament in West and East is twisted around in such a way that it 'matches' SED propaganda; there

is no reference to be found in it to the demand for taking down the already deployed Soviet SS-20 missiles which many social democrats, after all, demanded in the same breath in which they in 1983 rejected the deployment of new U.S. missiles on FRG soil." In NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, the SPD had "simply been transformed into an alliance partner to Soviet hegemonial policy fighting against the NATO missiles."

That analysis aids Professor Karl Kaiser and other social democratic university teachers in their taking issue with the "new course" in SPD security policy and, above all, with Egon Bahr. Bahr, the publisher of VORWAERTS and one of the most important spokesman for the "turn" in SPD security policy, had accused Kaiser in that weekly of having partly become a prisoner of CDU propaganda. Bahr had used against Kaiser the rhetorical question "Cui bono?" (Who does it benefit?) "Someone who introduces and uses that argument in the intra-party dispute would aim at debarring his opponent from that dispute. Egon Bahr's first argument against Karl Kaiser hence is an emotional one, meant to deprive his opponent of listeners in his own party. When someone uses, even introduces, such argumentation in the intra-party dispute, he must, above all, reconcile himself to being asked: Cui bono?"

Thereby Wilke, defending Schmidt's defense policy, got his own back. The material in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND offered itself in this matter, "almost embarrassingly": "No other social democrat gets as much space in the period documented in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND as Egon Bahr. In the columns of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Egon Bahr becomes the top-weight SPD politician." To the editors of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, though, this matter was a strict order from GDR agitprop. "The answer to the question of who gets the benefit from something is the crucial test for the analysis of any phenomenon" (Dictionary of Scientific Communism). Based on the Egon Bahr reports in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, one could be "certain" in saying "the SED leadership evidently was not of the opinion that it would be prevented by Egon Bahr's announcements from caricaturing the SPD by propaganda."

What then could the SPD do? It could take it easy as does its current leadership and act as if it was never bothered by "applause from the wrong side," particularly because it wanted to "debar" no one. Or it could itself write such a critical analysis of its image in the SED, perhaps in VORWAERTS. Chances are it has neither the time nor the desire nor the strength nor the mental lucidity for it. If it leaves such counter-criticism merely to minorities in the party, the words security partnership are but sound and smoke. The SPD should be first to turn against caricatures as drawn of it and of the FRG by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND. The SPD should need a new sense of its own spiritual self-affirmation in countering such SED propaganda campaigns. It could learn it from its own history. Only that is not fashionable there right now.

5885

CSO: 3620/158

FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS UNDER MITTERRAND EXAMINED

Paris NOTES ET ETUDES DOCUMENTAIRES in French Nos 437-438, 1983 pp 39-47

[Article by Thomas Schreiber, journalist with Radio-France Internationale, from volume "L'U.R.S.S. et l'Europe de l'Est en 1982-83" (The USSR and East Europe in 1982-83): "Franco-Soviet Relations (May 1981-June 1983)"]

[Text] Did the election of Francois Mitterrand to the presidency of the republic, on 10 May 1981, introduce a new era in Franco-Soviet relations?¹

Upon his arrival in the Elysee, the new chief of state took some firm positions on a good many problems on which the East and the West were opposed, from modernization of theater nuclear forces to the occupation of Afghanistan, and he bluntly denounced the Soviet military threat to Europe. And when Claude Arnaud, France's new ambassador to the USSR, presented his credentials in Moscow, he spoke of a "clear, realistic and constructive" dialogue between the two countries.

One could ask whether Francois Mitterrand judged that the "privileged relations" maintained by his predecessor were not beneficial for the interests of France, whether he wanted to make Leonid Brezhnev pay for his manifest preference for Valery Giscard d'Estaing in the course of the two presidential campaigns, whether he thought that he had all the more reason to keep from making advances to the Kremlin because he had Communist ministers in his government.²

Nevertheless, despite a noticeable change of diplomatic style and language, the fundamental orientation of French policy vis-a-vis the Kremlin has remained the same. Though citing again, on several occasions, the differences that separate France and the Soviet Union (whose primary strategic objective has long been to separate the defense of Europe from the defense of the Atlantic Alliance), the president of the republic and his minister of external relations have constantly repeated that they desire the development of bilateral relations.

Moscow's Reactions after the Election of Francois Mitterrand

On the Soviet side, there is apparently a certain nostalgia for the preceding period. Is it by chance that a book that opportunely came out in

Moscow in 1981 stresses that the "short presidency of Georges Pompidou and the 7-year term of Valery Giscard d'Estaing have demonstrated that detente has become the cornerstone of French foreign policy and that rejection of it would be equivalent to abandoning the independence acquired under de Gaulle"?³

From their reading of the articles that appeared in the Soviet press after 10 May 1981, many Western observers have concluded that socialist France disconcerts the Kremlin. Throughout the first year of Francois Mitterrand's 7-year term, the Soviet commentaries on French domestic policy were reserved: they reproached the "reformist trade unions" and the Socialists for making ever new concessions to big capital, while at the same time recognizing that there was quite a broad base for the "workers and the democratic forces to cooperate on several questions of current relevance."

On the other hand, with regard to foreign policy, the tendency of the Soviet media was for a long time to minimize the "negative" aspects of French diplomacy, placing emphasis on the elements close to the theses of Soviet diplomacy and highlighting the aspects incompatible with the American views.

In effect, while certain aspects of Francois Mitterrand's policy vis-a-vis the USSR are disapproved by Moscow, other aspects of his diplomacy are, on the contrary, appreciated. Thus, there is abundant comment on Paris's support for the cause of the Third World and the frictions that could have resulted from them with Washington concerning, for example, the sales of French weapons to Nicaragua, relations with the left of El Salvador, or the interest in the North-South economic problems.⁴

In July 1982, PRAVDA paid homage to the desire expressed by the French leaders to pursue an independent foreign policy, to reject the integration of France within the unified command of NATO, and to reject the embargo decreed by the United States in the matter of the Euro-Siberian gas pipeline. But the daily of the Communist Party of the USSR and other press organs criticized the French participation in the force sent into Lebanon and have denounced "certain circles" that take a position in favor of the "enemies of the Polish people." At no time has Francois Mitterrand been aimed at in particular: the president of the French Republic proves to be the least contested of the principal leaders of the Western world.

It is therefore obvious that despite the profound differences, the Kremlin has tried, when possible, to form new bonds with French diplomacy, reviving the "dynamic" of bilateral relations, "which have always been and remain an important factor for the safeguarding of peace and the development of cooperation in Europe--a standard phrase very popular among Moscow's media, which tirelessly evoke the "great moments" in Franco-Soviet friendship, from the exploits of the Normandie-Niemen flight during World War II to the joint space flight in 1982.

October 1982 marked the beginning of an "offensive of charm" aimed at France, caused by an unexpected change in the European balance with the

coming to power of a center-right government in Bonn, which was presided over by Helmut Kohl and of which Moscow feared the worst. "The situation in France," PRAVDA of 22 October explains, "is a living example of the class struggle...a lesson for all those who are fighting for democracy and liberty."

"The French parliamentary delegation that is visiting Moscow," remarks the correspondent of LE FIGARO⁵, "was able to sense suddenly, from the moment that Helmut Kohl took his oath before the Bundestag, a total turnabout in the previously rather cold attitude of its interlocutors."

Beyond the Differences, Bilateral Relations Are Being Pursued

On 11 November 1982 came the news of the death of Leonid Brezhnev, the only leader of the world's big states whom Francois Mitterrand had not met since his accession to the presidency of the republic.⁶

The change of leadership in the Kremlin immediately raised questions about a possible change in French policy.

President Francois Mitterrand, questioned by the editorial staff of LE MONDE⁷, made a clarifying statement: "There is no need for me to revise the policy of France. Everything is clear in our way of relating to the USSR ...which has a great and legitimate concern for its security. So do we. It should understand why, when it wants to include the French forces in the East-West calculation, I reject that.... No argument will make me change my mind on that point. On the other hand, I am opposed to any form of economic blockade against Russia, and France will not interrupt her exchanges with it." The president of the republic stated once again that "clear language is still, and always, the best means for being heard, without keeping silent about anything essential: our independence, our mode of civilization, the law of nations."

One month later, on 23 December 1982, Claude Cheysson declared, at the farewell luncheon offered in honor of the Soviet ambassador leaving his post: "We want to multiply the exchanges of views, to open up access to our cultures more widely. It is in this spirit of lucidity and openness that I will go to Moscow for a political visit to which my government attaches great importance." While at the same time referring to the "political disagreements" between the two countries, the minister of external relations hoped that they were "occasional" and stressed that Franco-Soviet dialogue was "of prime importance."

The minister has declared on many occasions that relations with the USSR would not be normal so long as the Soviet troops were in Afghanistan. But along with Claude Cheysson, several Socialist leaders, expressing themselves as members of their party, add that they have the certainty that "despite Afghanistan, the pressures exerted on Poland or Moscow's positions on the results of the Helsinki conference," partial openings are possible.⁸

On 9 February 1983, before the diplomatic press, Claude Cheysson made a broad review of the foreign policy of France, repeating the condemnation of

"certain Soviet decisions": the armed presence in Afghanistan, the pressures on Poland, the Euromissile buildup. "This condemnation has been expressed and will continue to be," he declared, "and prevents bilateral relations from being regular, normal and confident." However, France should have, with a superpower "that was our ally not so long ago," economic, commercial and cultural relations that "no one, not even our best allies, will prevent us from developing so long as they do not strengthen the military potential of the Warsaw Pact."

The announcement of Claude Cheysson's trip to Moscow, planned for February 1983, marked a date in the history of the bilateral relations between the two countries since 10 May 1981.⁹ In response to that announcement, ambassador Stepan Chervenko, a little before his leaving Paris (where he had spent nearly 10 years), praised the relations between the two countries, as representing "a model of relations between two states on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence." On 25 December 1982, the TASS agency paid noteworthy homage to Francois Mitterrand, "who has rejected the idea that a foreign power could run the economic and commercial policy of France."

Meanwhile, an unusual incident occurred. The presidents of the French television and radio networks, as well as the editors of several dailies, received a letter from the USSR embassy denouncing the way in which the French journalists were talking about the attempt at assassination of the pope on 13 May 1981, about the Bulgarian network, and about the role they were attributing to the Soviet services. At almost the same moment, a communique from the Political Bureau of the French Communist Part, published on 21 December 1982, denounced "the campaign of poisoning and falsification directed against the socialist countries," concluding that "the French have the right to demand that the national media put out truthful and honest information."¹⁰

Almost the entire press viewed the Soviet embassy's intervention as scandalous, despite explanations by a high-ranking diplomat.¹¹ But the incident, characteristic of a certain concept that the Soviets have about information, has remained isolated and has not had any political consequences.

The 17th Meeting of the Joint Economic "High Commission"

From 11 to 13 January 1983, the 17th meeting of the joint economic "high commission" was held in Paris, in the atmosphere the slowdown of exchanges between the two countries and their imbalance to the advantage of the USSR.¹² The statements made after this meeting were moderately optimistic. For Michel Jobert, then minister of foreign trade, his contacts with the Soviet side showed that "a rebalancing of exchanges is possible within the coming 2 or 3 years."¹³ For his part, Yuri Marchuk, vice chairman of the council of minister of the USSR, viewed "the future with confidence" and spoke of "temporary difficulties" to explain that the poorish trade balance of 1982 should not at all be interpreted "as a negative tendency in the future development of trade between the two countries."

On receiving the new Soviet ambassador, Yuli Vorontsov, on 3 February 1983, the president of the republic once again described France as "a loyal member of a defensive alliance, and at the same time, autonomous as regards its choices and its decisions"; he expressed the desire that Franco-Soviet economic and cultural relations develop and reach "a better level."

The Trip to Moscow by the French Minister of External Relations
(16-21 February 1983)

On the eve of the arrival of the chief of the Quai d'Orsay in Moscow, there was an attempt on the Soviet side to minimize the differences. In particular, a commentary by the NOVOSTI agency on 11 February, widely circulated, stressed that "the good relations between Paris and Moscow constitute an important factor in European and world politics," while at the same time expressing regret that the French government supports the NATO decision to install Pershing 2's in Europe.

The Kremlin wanted Claude Cheysson's visit to improve the political dialogue, hampered by the differences in the matters of European security, the maintenance of the Red Army's presence in Afghanistan and the events in Poland. Nevertheless, it was stated by an authoritative French source, before the minister's departure for Moscow, that Claude Cheysson was not to effect with Andrei Gromyko a "simple normalization of political relations, without modification of the reasons for the differences."

The way the official visit (16-21 February 1983) went--the first visit to Moscow by a chief of French diplomacy since the one by Jean Francois Poncet in 1979¹⁴--was effectively as expected. Though expressing pleasure at the continuance of political dialogue, "which for that matter has never been interrupted," the interlocutors recognized that the positions remained unchanged. "In his conversations both with Mr Gromyko and with Mr Andropov, Mr Cheysson did not seek to mask the differences between Paris and Moscow, by taking refuge in the wooden language of friendship between the peoples; on the contrary, he took advantage of his stay in the USSR to draw up a sharp and clear balance-sheet of the relations between the two countries, in completely unambiguous language," wrote LE MONDE's editorial writer.¹⁵

In this regard, Claude Cheysson's replies to the questions from the international press, and especially his toast on the occasion of the lunch offered by Andrei Gromyko on 17 February 1983, are of particular interest.¹⁶

Claude Cheysson, taking up the principles that the president of the republic had developed before the Bundestag on 19 January, reviewed the French positions in the matter of European security: the appearance of the SS-20's modified an American-Soviet nuclear balance that the Kremlin had itself proclaimed at the time of the SALT-2 negotiations; and by wanting to keep as many SS-20's as France and Great Britain have missiles (cf Andropov's latest proposals), the Soviets want to retain a certain margin of superiority.

As regards the other subjects raised during the talks, Claude Cheysson condemned the invasion of Afghanistan: "It is important to enter as soon as

possible into negotiations that lead to a solution protecting the legitimate interests and security of all the parties, with respect for the right of the peoples concerned for independence and self-determination." He spoke of the intolerable restriction of human rights and liberties: "The French government, like the French people, attaches great importance to the principle that people should be able to speak, express their ideas freely, and travel without constraint," with the hope that the "aspirations of all the peoples, and of the Polish people in particular, to whom France is attached by so many bonds, can again be expressed more freely and legitimately." It should be noted that certain passages in the remarks by the minister of external relations were "ignored" in the reports made by the TASS agency, which were picked up by the Soviet press as a whole, while others were summarized.

In the last analysis, has Claude Cheysson's visit to the Soviet Union proved to be a success or a failure? The members of the French delegation tended to think that the problem was not posed in such terms: rather than failure or success, it would be more appropriate to speak of "salutary clarification of bilateral relations."¹⁷

Moscow's Contradictory Reactions

This clarification seems to have caused apparently contradictory reactions in Moscow. On the occasion of a conference in Paris on "the realities of and outlooks for Franco-Soviet cooperation," PRAVDA of 7 March 1983 published a long article by Yuri Zhukov entitled "On the Basis of Common-Sense Positions." According to Mr Zhukov, a well-known specialist on French affairs, the "recent visits by the ministers Cresson, Chevenement and Cheysson and the 17th meeting of the high commission, which decided to seek actively for possibilities for a balanced development of trade relations, give a new and substantial impulse to cooperation by our two countries in all areas."

Just after that article appeared, the armed-forces daily, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, expressed concern about the "Atlanticist tendencies" of the French government, "which is tending to drift away from General de Gaulle's military doctrine." The journal spoke of a reorientation of that doctrine, further accentuated on the occasion of the Franco-German talks in Bonn in January 1983, and deplored the idea that France should agree to have, with the Federal Republic of Germany, "close and far-reaching consultations" on the nuclear potential of the two countries. The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article reflects the discontent in Soviet military circles, which perhaps were counting on a weakening of the French positions in the matter of the Euromissiles.

The Expulsion of the 47 Soviet Nationals

On 5 April 1983, the French authorities, certainly at the highest level, decided on a real clean-out aimed at Soviet espionage, ordering the expulsion of 47 diplomats, journalists and other nationals of the USSR.¹⁸ Such a measure, unprecedented in France, quite obviously had a political significance. It was specified by an authorized source that the expulsion of

those 47 nationals, all accused of activities contrary to their status, was the outcome of an accumulation of matters and not a response to a specific and recent case. According to the communique published by the Ministry of Interior on 5 April, "counter-espionage operations conducted by the DST [Directorate of Territorial Surveillance] for some time have revealed the systematic search on French territory, by a number of agents of the secret services of the USSR, for scientific, technical and technological intelligence, especially in the military area."

Moscow vigorously protested this decision, which it described as "totally unfounded and arbitrary," adding that "the responsibility for the consequences that this act entails for bilateral relations falls entirely on those who conceived it and carried it out."

The French Ministry of External Relations anticipated the reaction by letting it be known from the beginning of the affair that the government did not mean for these expulsions to "affect the subsequent development of relations between France and the USSR, and that any eventual negative effects would therefore not be the doing of France."

On 13 April 1983, on the eve of his official visit to Switzerland, President Mitterrand commented on the expulsion of the 47 Soviet functionaries in declaring that "our relations with the USSR will be excellent as of the time that everyone understands that mutual respect is the best of international laws," for, he added, "it is not a matter of an act of hostility toward the country in question; rather, it is a general rule, when a country discovers illicit action on its soil, to react...."

In certain circles, Soviet reprisals were expected, of the same kind as those which in 1971, after 15 days of reflection, followed the expulsion of 105 Soviets by the British authorities. But it rapidly emerged that Moscow's rulers did not want to magnify the incident. Thus it was that the TASS communique protesting the expulsions was not printed by all the Moscow newspapers, but only on an inside page of PRAVDA, under a neutral headline. The Kremlin was obviously counting on dealing with the affair calmly on the governmental level, while at the same time reacting on another level by unleashing a campaign of anti-French propaganda. In a few days, in fact, France became one of the favorite targets of the media, which denounced the "pro-Atlanticist tendencies" of French government policy (the theme of an article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 19 April), and its African policy (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA attacked the activity of the French secret services in Africa in liaison with the CIA and the Israeli Mossad); IZVESTIA described France's position in the Near East as hypocritical; in the view of the TASS agency, the CIA operates on French territory with total impunity, enjoying the complacency of "certain influential circles." Soviet newspapers expressed indignation at the "persecution" that the immigrant workers in France are allegedly subject to. Not to overlook the publication by PRAVDA, on 19 April, of a long commentary on the French political situation, stressing how far away the Communists stand from the government's economic program.

The same day, Yuri Andropov received in Moscow the editor of the FRG weekly DER SPIEGEL. The passages from their talks relating to France (published on 25 April) confirm the Soviet leadership's desire "not to fall into provocation." In other words, no reprisals against the French personnel working in the USSR. "In showing moderation," the secretary general of the CPSU declared in particular, "we are guided by concern for the long-term interests of Franco-Soviet relations, which are valuable to us and which have been developed over a long period, in the interest of the maintenance of detente in Europe."¹⁹ But he also let it be understood that the political differences between Moscow and Paris remain fundamental, especially with regard to the Euromissiles. That is also the opinion of the NEW CHINA agency²⁰: "While the expulsion of 47 of its citizens has considerably embarrassed the Soviet Union, and while the points of conflict between the two countries have been aggravated, the USSR and France do not seem to want to see their relations completely paralyzed."

At the end of June 1983, in fact, a Soviet parliamentary delegation, led by Mikhail Zimianin, secretary of the Central Committee and vice chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Soviet of Nationalities, was on an official visit in France, to meet numerous personalities, including Pierre Mauroy, Louis Mermaz and Claude Cheysson. The members of the delegation again expressed concern about the "changes in the orientations of French foreign policy," repeating the particularly numerous accusations leveled by the Soviet press in May and in June.²¹ The parliamentarians' visit took place in an atmosphere described by Maurice Faure, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, as "frank but often sharp." At the Quai d'Orsay, there was even "astonishment" at the statements made about the French forces by a member of the delegation.²²

FOOTNOTES

1. On the evolution of Franco-Soviet relations before the arrival of the left in power, cf Maxime Mourin, "Les relations franco-sovietiques (1917-1967)" [Franco-Soviet Relations (1917-1967)], Payot, 1967; "Franco-Soviet Relations (1958-1966)," in NOTES ET ETUDES DOCUMENTAIRES, No 3,302, of 24 June 1966, and several chapters in our study "The Relations of France with the Countries of the East (1944-1980)," NOTES ET ETUDES DOCUMENTAIRES, Nos 4,569-4,570, of 30 April 1980. For the first part of the present mini-dossier, we made use of the study by Robert Legvold appearing in POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 4/82, entitled "Soviet Policy vis-a-vis Socialist France," from which we summarize several passages.
2. Cf the article by Maurice Delarue in LE MONDE of 13 November 1982, and BEIPI [expansion unknown], No 660, of 31 January 1983.
3. V. Slavenov, "The External Policy of France (1974-1981)" (in Russian), Moscow, 1981; reported in LA VIE INTERNATIONALE, Moscow, January 1983.
4. Cf Robert Legvold, op cit, pp 884-885.

5. Cf LE FIGARO of 23 October 1982.
6. Francois Mitterrand, then first secretary of the Socialist Party, had a talk with Leonid Brezhnev in April 1975 ("The interview was very direct, very frank and very cordial," the future president of the republic was to say later).
7. Cf LE MONDE of 26 November 1982; see also the LDGDS [expansion unknown] data bank of LA DOCUMENTATION FRANCAISE.
8. Cf the interview given by Pierre Joxe, chairman of the Socialist group in the National Assembly, in LE MONDE of 14 November 1982.
9. Several members of the government--Mme Cresson and Messrs Jobert and Chevenement--as well as a parliamentary delegation led by Maurice Faure have already visited the Soviet capital; Claude Cheysson has spoken with Andrei Gromyko several times, on the occasion of his work at the United Nations, in New York.
10. At the end of 1982, the Soviet journals, IZVESTIA in particular, complained about what they called "the campaign of anti-Soviet hate" by the "French bourgeois press."
11. In an interview given to France-Inter on 23 December, Nicolai Afanasievski, minister-adviser of the embassy, gave a lengthy explanation of the "firm grounds" for the letter sent to the media.
12. Cf LE MONDE of 12 January 1983. On the evolution of Franco-Soviet economic relations, cf COURRIER DES PAYS DE L'EST, No 271, LA DOCUMENTATION FRANCAISE, Paris, March 1983.
13. Interview given to Radio-France Internationale, broadcast on 13 January 1983.
14. In November 1982, Claude Cheysson attended the funeral of Leonid Brezhnev, in the company of Pierre Mauroy.
15. Cf LE MONDE of 23 February 1983.
16. Texts communicated to the author during his stay in Moscow (Thomas Schreiber).
17. Cf LE MONDE of 23 February 1983.
18. On this affair, see the French press of 6, 7 and 8 April 1983.
19. The manifest determination on the part of the French government was also able to play a role. Francois Mitterrand is said to have let it be known that a very considerable new list of "expellable" Soviet diplomats would be presented if reprisals were taken. LE MONDE of 24 and 25 April 1983.

20. On 23 April 1983. BEIJING INFORMATION of 2 May 1983 speaks also of the "cooling" of Franco-Soviet relations and highlights the "repeated attacks by the Moscow press" against French domestic and external policy.
21. Cf the articles in NEW TIMES of 20 May 1983, PRAVDA of 1 and 17 June 1983, etc. The bulletin of the Soviet information bureau in Paris publishes a French translation of its articles, picked up by other Soviet journals.
22. On the visit by the Soviet parliamentarians, cf LE MONDE of 30 June and 1 July 1983 and L'HUMANITE of 4 July 1983.

11267

CSO: 3519/190

BACKGROUND ON PASOK YOUTH LEADERSHIP

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 1 Jan 84 p 2

/Article by I. Theofylaktos/

/Excerpts/ TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS, taking into account the contribution of the PASOK youth organization in the development of political events in our country, will give a picture of this organization. In the following report, not only will there be a useful who's who in the organization but there will be an attempt to outline the work, prospects and goals of the most powerful youth organization of the country.

Party responsibility of the PASOK youth organization is in the hands of the following: Deputy Minister of the New Generation Kostas Laliotis for the executive office; Deputies Stefanos Tzoumakas and Giannis Souladakis for the executive secretariat.

Today, the PASOK youth organization has 75,000 members in all areas of activity.

The Youth Committee, with 21 members, is at the top of the organizational structure. First in the hierarchy is the secretary, Stefanos Manikas, 31 years of age, a dentist. Then there are three alternate secretaries: Thanasis Kourmatzis, a student in the field of industry, 28 years of age, in charge of youth of local organizations and of working youth. Giannis Nikolaou, a graduate of the Pandeion, 26 years of age, responsible for students. Fotis Khatzimikhalis, an economics student, 25 years of age, responsible for students.

The other members of the Youth Committee are members of various offices (coming under the Youth Committee) and direct the work of each area as follows:

The Local Organizations Office headed by Alexis Spanos, a Polytechnic Institute student, 23 years of age. Also in the Local Organizations Office are Vangelis Votsis, a student in physics, 22 years of age; Vasilis Zerdelis, a private employee, 32 years of age; and Adriani Kefala, an employee and a graduate of the KATEE /Higher Technical Education Center of Greece/, 24 years of age.

The Working Youth Office headed by Khristos Smyrlis, dentist, 30 years of age. Also in the Working Youth Office are Khristos Dermalis, an employee, 33 years of age; and Giorgos Nikitakis, a working student, 22 years of age.

The Students Office headed by Ms Maria Velonaki, a graduate of the Pandeion. Also on the Students Office are Grigoris Katsogiannis, a physics student, 22 years of age.

The AEI /Supreme Educational Institutions/ Office headed by Takis Dokos, a student in the field of industry, 24 years of age. Also in the AEI Office are Giannis Tsamourgelis, a student in financial jurisprudence, 23 years of age, PASP /Panhellenic Militant Student Faction/ representative on the EFEE /National Student Union of Greece/ Central Council; Vasilis Thomopoulos, a student of the Pandeion; and Kimon Papageorgiou, a Polytechnic Institute student, 24 years of age.

The Technical Education Office headed by Artemis Vagionakis, a student in the KATEE, 24 years of age. Also in the Technical Education Office is Vasilis Lestakis, a KATEE graduate and an economics student, 24 years of age.

Two other Youth Committee members have responsibilities in special areas: Giorgos Kanellopoulos, a Pandeion graduate, 25 years of age, is head of the Press Office and of the organization's periodical AGONISTIS. The other is Ms Sylvana Rapti, an economics student and Athens municipal councilor, 25 years of age, who is responsible for international relations.

Together with the members of the Youth Committee, another 75 organizational cadres fill positions in the various offices each year and constitute the spinal column of the organization.

5671

CSO: 3521/145

GOVERNMENT DENIES SHIFTING TO CENTRIST POSITION

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 19 Jan 84 p 1

/Text/ The government does not accept the "description of centrist policy" attributed to it following the government reshuffle. The government spokesman vigorously emphasized yesterday that there are no political tendencies within PASOK. The spokesman was answering press reports to the effect that Mr Ap. Lazaris' assumption of a key ministry meant a move toward a centrist political orientation by the government. At the same time, Mr E. Averof, ND leader, speaking to his party's parliamentary group, described the new government as a "government of despair."

Refuting press reports yesterday, the government spokesman said, "There are no splits within PASOK. All of that is nothing but artful fabrication." At the same time, the spokesman avoided answering how he refutes similar information (about a centrist orientation) when PASOK itself maintains that it is a democratic party and this the existence of various tendencies within its ranks is completely justified and essential.

According to political observers, the government's annoyance is attributed to pressures on the prime minister by partisans who had significantly lost power following the reshuffle. These partisans present this information as a threat to PASOK and as a danger for losing its leftist wing at a time when the economic crisis has led many worker groups to threaten going on strike. They thus maintain that if the government appears to have a centrist orientation it will lose the support of the leftist trade union cadres, with the result being that the damage to the government by the strike movement will be much greater.

This conflict within the government party also appeared from the statement by the government spokesman who yesterday tried to explain the jurisdictions in public administration.

The spokesman said that Messrs Ap. Lazaris and Ang. Koutsogiorgas are co-responsible for public administration and he explained that Mr Koutsogiorgas, as minister of interior, will be involved with issues affecting the provinces. However, when asked if this meant that Mr Lazaris, as minister to the prime minister, will be responsible for the capital, the spokesman answered no. Finally, the spokesman explained that the apportionment of authority between Messrs Lazaris and Koutsogiorgas remains the same as before the reshuffle.

This retraction is the first made, indeed one day after the reshuffle and is confirmed by the fact that during the day before yesterday's meeting of the Government Council on the economic situation no progress had been noted. In connection with the imposition of new tax measures and the raising of prices that the government has been planning for some time now, this time party officials on the Government Council, together with Mr Gennimatas, appeared rather tough by not wanting to accept any surrender whatsoever of their policy, as they themselves see as being socialistic. Mr Arsenis is now turning to this political view of Mr Gennimatas. Mr Arsenis wants in this way to acquire support from among party officials so as to confront Mr Lazaris, who is the number one minister and the primary adviser to the prime minister, with regard to an opening in economic policy.

Participating in the day before yesterday's Government Council meeting, held under the chairmanship of the prime minister, were Messrs Lazaris, Arsenis, Koutsogiorgas, Tsokhatzopoulos, Pottakis and Gennimatas. The meeting will be resumed shortly because the imposition of higher prices on several items, especially fuels, is described by the Ministry of Finance as urgent.

5671

CSO: 3521/145

INTERNAL ND YOUTH PURGES, MORE EXPECTED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 24 Dec 83, 17 Jan 84

/24 Dec 83 p 1/

/Text/ The crisis that recently broke out within ONNED's /New Democracy Youth Organization/ student organization is gradually spreading to other ND youth groups.

According to reliable information, feelings are especially high in many ONNED nome committees in northern Greece where cadres who are known for their moderate political positions are now openly expressing their disagreement with the leadership group under Mr V. Mikhaloliakos. The center for these developments is Salonica and the neighboring nomes.

On the basis of existing information, the small group of friends of Mr Mikhaloliakos, that heads up the ONNED nome committee in Salonica, together with Messrs Valianos and Pendeas, is decided --on orders received from the ONNED leadership-- to purge the youth organization of all liberal and moderate cadres.

These activities, which became more evident with the "lightning" visit by Mr Mikhaloliakos to Salonica last Sunday, has brought together a large number of youth cadres throughout northern Greece under the leadership of certain members of the Salonica ONNED nome committee who express liberal and moderate views. It is being said that the latter are decided to react directly to the impending purges.

Mr Mikhaloliakos' and his friends' anger is centered primarily on Messrs Sakis Kekhagioglou (responsible for ideological issues on the Salonica ONNED nome committee) and Grig. Sarafianos (responsible for the Second District of Salonica). The former had indeed already provoked the anger of the ONNED leadership because he had taken the initiative for organizing the speeches of Andr. Andrianopoulos and Georgios Stefanakis in Salonica. He also actively participated in the KPEE /Center for Political Research and Training/ demonstration that took place in Salonica on 4 November 1983.

In connection with these developments, ND party circles in northern Greece observe that if the ONNED leadership carries out the rumored purges it will deal a serious blow to the cohesiveness of the youth organization and will lead to its complete disorganization.

/17 Jan 84 p 2/

/Text/ The current troubles prevailing in ONNED are growing. Moderate cadres are questioning the correctness of the line being followed by the ND youth leadership. The ONNED disciplinary council yesterday purged 13 youth cadres and said that their criticism is "in line with the slanderous campaign being skillfully orchestrated against ONNED by the government party."

Evidently trying to head off any further reactions, the ONNED disciplinary council said that the purged cadres had conducted "anti-party activities for the purpose of dealing a blow to the solid unity and democratic militancy of the organization's youth.

"At a time when ONNED is rallying the majority of Greek youth, such activities are in line with the slanderous campaign being skillfully orchestrated against ONNED by the government party."

The following are those purged from the ONNED:

Alkis Psaras, Alexis Pelekis, Ilias Volonasis, Fotis Karatzenis, and Nikos Giannis (law students); Giorgos Alexopoulos, Kleanthis Psarris and Dimosthenis Gallis (mathematics students); Dimitris Vasileiou (political science student); Stamatis Mavros, Sokratis Khatziioannou, Mikhail Khatzidakis and Nikos Noutsous (economics students).

The disciplinary council also meted out sentences to other members, specifically it prohibited them from attending organizational meetings for the next 2 months. The following were involved:

Nikos Argyropoulos, Matina Vasileiou, Maria Gavouneli (law students) and Giorgos Giannis (civil engineering student).

Finally, written reprimands were meted out to the following: Stathis Kalyvas (political science student) and Giorgos Pistiolas (economics student).

5671

CSO: 3521/145

EVOLUTION OF PS/PSD 'CENTER BLOC' STRATEGY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Dec 83 pp 20 R-21R

/Article by Teresa de Sousa/

/Text/ Because there are no substantive alternatives, selecting the national themes for 1983 turned out to be easier than selecting the international ones.

We chose Finance and Planning Minister Ernani Lopes as this year's leading national figure and the creation of the center bloc as the most relevant event of this period. EXPRESSO's editorial staff believed that the remaining possibilities raised were far from comparable to those chosen. In the case of Ernani Lopes, we kept in mind the fact that his economic policy decisions are indelibly reflected in the lives of all Portuguese. His election (as a matter of fact, like all the others) is not based on any performance based judgement of the person under consideration. The question is not how well or how badly he governed but whether or not his leadership had any effect on national life. In the case of Ernani Lopes, there is no doubt that it had more effect than any other national figure. In selecting the center bloc as the event of the year, the determining factor was the fact that this was a first in the current political-party picture and based, as it is, on a large parliamentary majority it, therefore, theoretically benefits from good conditions (initially) for governing and stability. No other event in 1983 can challenge this one in importance and impact.

On 4 June 1983, Mario Soares and Mota Pinto, representing the PS /Socialist Party/ and the PSD /Social Democratic Party/ respectively, signed a "political parliamentary and governmental agreement" in Lisbon based on the shared view of the nation's "political, financial and economic crisis.

This Allinace between the two largest Portuguese parties was aimed at--as the text of the agreement defined it--"obtaining a stable parliamentary majority and forming a center-left government that would be guided by the principles of political reform, economic modernization and social justice characteristic of the ideals of democratic socialism and social democracy in today's Europe."

The need to face up to the impending financial crisis was at the core of such an agreement. It led to the formation of the last political solution left to be tried since democracy was instituted in 1976. This was, at the same time, the most obvious political solution and the most difficult to achieve in reality.

A long experience of political instability that successively drained the ability of the Left to govern (without it being possible for it to form a political majority) as well as the Right's ability to govern (without a social majority, leadership and a plan) was left behind.

The failed attempt to form a "coherent majority bloc" capable of becoming "a central bloc of progress and moderation" based on the presidency and supported by the two largest Portuguese parties' dissidents was also left behind.

For this reason the PS-PDS coalition was born in 1983, against the wishes of its protagonists. As much as they may want to call it "center-left" or a "PS-PSD government," in the Portuguese collective imagination it is the "Center bloc" that has finally taken shape--either to die shortly or to consolidate itself around a common political strategy. In any event, it is destined to be a landmark; the (?beginning--text illegible) of the breakup of the regime or of its renewal.

Eanes' "Center Bloc"

Four years of great differences separate the "center bloc" theorized and tried without success in 1978-79 from the "center bloc" that Mario Soares is betting on.

The possible occupation of the political center would have been made against the PS and the PSD 4 years earlier and without the benefit of any possible understanding between the two largest Portuguese parties. It would have been created from top to bottom: from the president to the parties based on Eanes' institutional leadership.

The failure of the two socialist governments in 1978-79, which ended the PS' hegemony, and the lack of an alternative from the Right (which was to appear only later) temporarily created the conditions for the ideas of the original "center bloc" to surge again.

At that time, it was a matter of defending a strategy based on presidential initiative that would allow, in Sousa Franco's words,

the creation of "a coherent urban and rural majority social bloc which potentially exists in Portuguese society, and of the resulting political bloc." Such a "bloc" was to undertake a social democratic policy, the same policy that the attempts by the PS and the PSD to negotiate directly in 1976 and 1977 unfortunately did not achieve.

Shortly thereafter, it was Antonio Barreto's (a socialist dissident) turn to propose for the first time the "coinciding strategy of three majorities: the constitutional, presidential and parliamentary." This was immediately followed by the appearance of a concrete proposal for a "democratic reform bloc" built upon the President's "institutional leadership."

The Eanes' supported "center bloc" had the greatest chance of becoming reality in 1979.

This is that brief period of presidential initiative governments--the Nobre da Costa, Mota Pinto and Pintasilgo governments--and it is the time when the first organized attempts were made to occupy the center between the PS and the PSD (the "Reformers" and the beginning of ASDI) /Social Democrats Independent Action/ and form a party to serve as a pivot in balancing the alternation of power, the strategy of the "fifth party."

Sa Carneiro's stake in bipolarization and the creation of the AD /Democratic Alliance/ were enough to put an end to any faint desires for a political opening in the center which Eanes would lead.

In the meantime, it was the inability of the Portuguese Right to put the strategy of "one majority, one government, one president" into practice, rather than the death of its two main architects, that marked the beginning of the end of its reign. It collapsed without a leader and without a plan.

The AD was already in an advanced state of political agony and gasping its last breaths in early 1983 as it attempted to form the Crespo government when Mota Amaral, who was always distant from an alliance he never supported, proposed a "national consensus" government formed by "presidential initiative." This was a final attempt to avoid early elections and the strong return of the socialist hegemony (not Eanes') and the unavoidable subordination of the PSD.

Soares' Center Bloc

The political-party picture took on its original shape when the AD crumbled and elections were called. The Left was blocked by the historical impossibility of a PS-PCP majority and the Right was worn out because of the PSD-CDS alliance's failure.

The worsening economic situation and the specter of financial failure serves as a backdrop to this.

The PS easily won the 25 April elections.

The winning party and its leader have a "strategy." It involves forming a coalition government with the PSD which will create a broad social democratic bloc capable of taking Soares to Belem in 1985 and, finally, stabilizing the democratic regime around one majority, one government, one president.

It is, in the end, the same path as that of the AD. The only differences is that it is based on polarization at the center and having the same person in the role of presidential candidate and leader of the largest party.

However, Mario Soares also has an excuse: the economic crisis and the specter of bankruptcy threaten the regime and "force" the PSD to sacrifice and return to the government, now as a junior partner in a coalition with the PS and subordinated to its strategy.

The Second Period

Somewhat surprisingly, it was easy to bring about the first period of the "center bloc:" the period when a "parliamentary and governmental agreement" capable of facing up to the crisis was reached.

Once the (threatening) "curve" of financial bankruptcy is passed, there will have to be a second period for this "center bloc" to find a common and coherent strategy to put in effect a policy of structural changes or, above all, for the 1985 presidential elections. It must do this under the penalty of losing political initiative and never being more than "the bloc to balance the foreign accounts."

In addition to the strength of its leadership, Mario Soares' "center bloc" enjoys some advantages right from the beginning. It does not have a viable alternative and it is unlikely that it will have any before 1985. It tactically works against Eanes or, at least, removes the reason for the resurgence of a Eanist plan.

On the other hand, it carries a great risk in the short run: it only makes sense while it "readjusts" the political spectrum and indirectly calls into question the PSD as it exists today.

For this reason, it can be said that there are only two apparently coherent strategies within the PSD: the strategy of those who oppose the coalition but defend the bipolarization of the regime and the recreation of a liberal-conservative bloc as an alternative to Socialist Party dominance, and the now barely perceivable strategy of those who bet on Soares winning the presidential election and strengthening the presidency as part of a necessary step toward stabilizing the regime.

It remains to be seen who, how, and under what conditions will be able to lead the negotiations to reach an agreement with the socialists on the type of regime. Nevertheless, it is known that only such an agreement will be able to mark the second period needed to consolidate this "center bloc."

Will it survive beyond the resolution of the financial crisis? Will it overcome the counter offensive that will shortly unfold within the PSD?

Time, not necessarily a long time, will provide the answer to these questions. It is even very possible that the national political event of 1984 will be the breakup of the PSD or...the end of the center bloc.

9935

CSO: 8142/0554-C

MEMBERSHIP OF NEW PCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 22 Dec 83 p 8

[Text] Active Members

Abilio Lopes Martins Metalworker, aged 51	Antonio Jose Orcinha Rodrigues Metalworker, aged 34
Adelino Pereira da Silva Metalworker, aged 44	Antonio dos Santos Murteira Agricultural engineer, aged 36
Albano Freire Nunes Intellectual, aged 42	Antonio Santo Metalworker, aged 55
Agostinho Nuno de Azevedo Ferreira Lopes Engineer, aged 39	Antonio dos Santos Graca Employee, aged 45
Alexandre Teixeira Metalworker, aged 31	Antonio da Silva Mota Metalworker, aged 46
Alvaro Cunhal Attorney, aged 70	Armando da Conceicao Morals de Oliveira Metalworker, aged 38
Americo Lazaro Leal Cork worker, aged 61	Armando Monteiro Nogueira Metalworker, aged 37
Angelo Matos Mendes Veloso Intellectual, aged 53	Artur Jose Vidal Pinto Factory worker, aged 37
Antonio da Conceicao Andrez Employee, aged 32	Aurelio Monteiro dos Santos Intellectual, aged 53
Antonio Dias Lourenco da Silva Metalworker, aged 68	Bernardina Lucia Sebastiao Factory worker, aged 30
Antonio Fernandes Martins Coelho Employee, aged 43	Branca Maria da Cruz de Carvalho Employee, aged 30
Antonio Joaquim de Azevedo Ferreira Lopes Employee, aged 36	Carlos Afredo de Brito Employee, aged 50
Antonio Joaquim Gervasio Farm worker, aged 56	Carlos Augusto Pinhao Correia Small merchant, aged 57
Antonio Jose Casmarrinha Worker, aged 36	Carlos Campos Rodrigues Costa Intellectual, aged 56

Carlos Alberto do Vale Gomes Carvalhas
Intellectual, aged 41

Carlos Aboim Ingles
Intellectual, aged 53

Carlos Luis Figueira
Employee, aged 39

Carlos Manuel Ferreira da Paz Ramildes
Factory worker, aged 34

Diamantino Jose Dias
Metalworker, aged 33

Diniz Fernandes Miranda
Farm worker, aged 54

Domingos Abrantes Ferreira
Metalworker, aged 47

Domingos Oliveira Dias
Metalworker, aged 30

Edgar Maciel Almeida Correia
Engineer, aged 38

Ernesto dos Santos Afonso
Metalworker, aged 34

Euclides Fernades Pereira
Employee, aged 42

Eugenio Baeta Ribeiro Pisco
Metalworker, aged 32

Fernando Blanqui Teixeira
Engineer, aged 61

Fernando das Neves Teixeira
Factory worker, aged 40

Francisco Jose de Almeida Lopes
Factory worker, aged 28

Francisco Miguel Duarte
Factory worker, aged 76

Francisco do Rosario Maia Lancinha
Factory worker, aged 48

Georgete de Oliveria Ferreira
Textile worker, aged 58

Henrique Florentino Pacheco das Neves
Metalworker, aged 27

Henrique Jose Carvalho de Sousa
Employee, aged 32

Hipolito Fialho dos Santos
Metalworker, aged 43

Horacio Jose Cecilio Rufino
Employee, aged 33

Ilidio Dias Esteves
Factory worker, aged 59

Jaime dos Santos Serra
Factory worker, aged 62

Jaime de Sousa Felix
Factory worker, aged 43

Joao de Matos Bernardino
Employee, aged 36

Joaquim Gomes dos Santos
Glass worker, aged 66

Joaquim Jorge Alves de Araujo
Intellectual, aged 47

Joaquim Pires Jorge
Factory worker, aged 76

Jorge Manuel Sario de Matos
Primary school teacher, aged 37

Jose Augusto Esteves
Employee, aged 36

Jose Baptista Mestre Soeiro
Farm worker, aged 35

Jose Carlos Almeida
Employee, aged 52

Jose Machado Moreira Rita
Farm worker, aged 41

Jose Manuel Mendonca de Oliveira Bernardino
Intellectual, aged 48

Jose Norueira da Silva Casanova
Factory worker, aged 44

Jose Pedro Correia Soares
Factory worker, aged 33

Jose Teodosio Cachochas
Metalworker, aged 38

Julio Antonio Delaunay Filipe
Factory worker, aged 35

Luisa Araujo
Employee, aged 36

Manuel Martins Pedro
Employee, aged 52

Manuel Sobral Antunes Pereira
Employee, aged 39

Jose Rodrigues Vitoriano
Factory worker, aged 65

Manuel Vasco da Costa Ferreira Palva
Employee, aged 31

Maria Alda Barbosa Nogueira
Intellectual, aged 60

Maria Helena Guimaraes Medina
Intellectual, aged 33

Maria Margarida Carmo Tangarrinha
Intellectual, aged 55

Maria da Piedade Morgadinho Monteiro
dos Santos
Intellectual, aged 50

Maria Rosa Monteiro Rabiais
Employee, aged 30

Marilia Pereira Villaverde Cabral
Employee, aged 41

Moises Belo Calado
Farm worker, aged 36

Octavio Floriano Rodrigues Pato
Employee, aged 58

Oscar Luso de Freitas Lopes
College professor, aged 68

Alternate Members

Americo Bernardo Abalada
Civil construction worker, aged 30

Ana Benedita Ramos Caro
Farm worker, aged 38

Antonio Afonso Lima Martins
Civil construction worker, aged 29

Antonio Baptista Cordeiro
Factory worker, aged 32

Antonio Jose Anacleto
Small farmer, aged 49

Antonio Simoes de Abreu
Engineer, aged 36

Armando da Silva Carvalho
Farmer, aged 30

Augusto da Silva Carreto
Farm worker, aged 30

Avelino Pacheco Goncalves
Employee, aged 44

Raimundo do Ceu Cabral
Farm worker, aged 36

Raimundo Pedro Narciso
Intellectual, aged 45

Rogério Rodrigues de Carvalho
Employee, aged 63

Rosa de Oliveira Dias
Textile worker, aged 27

Sergio Manuel de Sousa Teixeira
Factory worker, aged 33

Sergio de Matos Vilarigues
Factory worker, aged 68

Severiano Pedro Falcao
Factory worker, aged 60

Sofia de Oliveira Ferreira Santo
Factory worker, aged 61

Vitor Manuel Caetano Dias
Intellectual, aged 38

Zita Maria Seabra Roseiro
Intellectual, aged 34

Carlos Alberto Mendes Grilo
Employee, aged 38

Carlos Manuel Guerra Fraiao
Intellectual, aged 35

Carlos Vitor Baptista da Costa
Intellectual, aged 44

Cesar Manuel Cavalheiro Roussado
Employee, aged 38

Clarinda Maria Pinto Nogueira
Employee, aged 30

Dionisio Moises Simoes
Farm worker, aged 40

Domingos Martins Morim Lopes
Intellectual, aged 34

Emidio Jose de Vasconcelos Pinto Ribeiro
Intellectual, aged 35

Eulalia Rosa Caeiro Miranda
Factory worker, aged 29

Fernando Esteves Vicente
Engineer, aged 42

Fernando Freitas Rodrigues
Employee, aged 29

Fernando Lopes Oliveira
Employee, aged 31

Francisco Antonio Braz Caixinha
Farm worker, aged 29

Francisco Joaquim Lourenco Pereira
Factory worker, aged 26

Francisco Rodrigues Lobo
Metalworker, aged 52

Helder da Silva Nobre Madeira
Employee, aged 44

Henrique Nines Lemos
Factory worker, aged 39

Horacio Antonio Simoes da Costa Guimaraes
Intellectual, aged 35

Jeronimo Carvalho de Sousa
Metalworker, aged 36

Joao Alberto Garcia de Abreu
Civil construction worker, aged 27

Joao Antonio Torrinhas Paulo
Metalworker, aged 34

Joao Jose Alfacinha Pinheiro
Factory worker, aged 39

Joao Maria de Andrade Fernandes da Fonseca
Employee, aged 44

Joaquim Augusto Nunes Pina Moura
Intellectual, aged 31

Joaquim Caetano Bexiga Tofes
Factory worker, aged 28

Joaquim Estevao Miguel Judas
Intellectual, aged 32

Joaquim Fernando Gorjao Duarte
Intellectual, aged 42

Joaquim Inacio Charneca Miguel
Farm worker, aged 36

Joaquim Manuel Almeida Dias
Factory worker, aged 38

Jorge Manuel Duarte Paixao
Factory worker, aged 26

Jose Bento Paleta Fernandes
Metalworker, aged 35

Jose de Sousa Cavaco
Engineer, aged 42

Jose Eduardo Bicudo Decq Neta
Intellectual, aged 34

Jose Francisco Madeira Cheira
Farm worker, aged 40

Jose Goncalo Simao Timoteo
Metalworker, aged 31

Jose Luis Correia da Silva
Farm worker, aged 44

Jose Manuel Aranha Figueiredo
Factory worker, aged 35

Jose Manuel Calado Ferreira Neto
Intellectual, aged 36

Jose Manuel Gomes de Freitas
Employee, aged 40

Jose Manuel Mala Nunes de Almeida
Metalworker, aged 38

Jose Rodrigues Antunes
Factory worker, aged 28

Jose Vieira
Metalworker, aged 35

Lucinio Branco Amante Fale
Employee, aged 39

Manuel Antonio Teixeira de Freitas
Textile worker, aged 34

Manuel Antonio Vicente
Farm worker, aged 53

Manuel Mendes Nobre Gusmao
Asst., Faculty of Letters, Lisbon, aged 38

Maria da Conceicao Morais Matias
Employee, aged 34

Maria Elvira Barreira Ferreira Nereu
Employee, aged 42

Maria Fernanda Santos Cardoso Mateus
Textile worker, aged 24

Maria Fernanda de Sousa Barroso
Engineer, aged 35

Maria Leonor Maia Xavier
Farm worker, aged 33

Maria Teresa de Azevedo Ferreira Lopes Secondary school teacher, aged 32	Serafim Manuel Seaфра da Silva Farm worker, aged 30
Miguel da Conceicao Joao Farm worker, aged 33	Virgilio Manuel Franca Azevedo Metalworker, aged 30
Rogério Fernando da Silva Ribeiro Teacher and sculptor, aged 53	Vitor Alberto Alvao dos Santos Factory worker, aged 30
Rogério Francisco Arraiolos Farm worker, aged 46	Vitor Jose Cabrita Neto Intellectual, aged 40
Romeo Augusto Domingos do Rosario Employee, aged 42	Vitor Luis Cabral de Castro Factory worker, aged 42
Ruben Luis Tristao de Carvalho e Silva Intellectual, aged 39	Vitor Manuel Marques Fernandes Employee, aged 41
Serafim Bras da Silva Farmer, aged 29	Luis Manuel da Silva Viana de Sa Intellectual, aged 31

Executive organs of the Central Committee

Political Commission

Active:

Alvaro Cunhal
 Angelo Veloso
 Dias Lourenco
 Antonio Gervasio
 Carlos Brito
 Carlos Costa
 Diniz Miranda
 Domingos Abrantes
 Fernando Blanqui Teixeira
 Jaime Serra
 Joaquim Gomes
 Jore araujo
 Jose Sociro
 Jose Casanova
 Jose Vitoriano
 Octavio Pato
 Raimundo Cabral
 Sergio Vilarigues

Alternate:

Antonio Lopes
 Antonio Orcinha
 Artur Vidal Pinto
 Bernardina Sebastiao
 Carlos Ramildes
 Edgar Correia
 Zita Serbra

Permanent Political Secretariat

Alvaro Cunhal
 Carlos Brito
 Carlos Costa
 Domingos Abrantes
 Octavio Pato

Secretariat

Active:

Alvaro Cunhal
 Carlos Costa
 Domingos Abrantes
 Fernando Blanqui Teixeira
 Joaquim Gomes
 Jorge Araujo
 Octavio Pato
 Sergio Vilarigues

Alternate:


Jaime Felix
 Luisa Araujo

Secretary General:


Alvaro Cunhal

711

PCP



Alvaro Cunhal



Ângelo Veloso



Dias Lourenço




Jaime Serra



Joaquim Gomes



Jorge Araújo



António Lopes



António Orcinha



Artur Vidal Pinto



António Gervásio



Carlos Brito



Carlos Costa



José Soeiro




José Casanova




José Vitoriano



Bernardina Sebastião




Carlos Ramildes



Edgar Correia



Diniz Miranda




Domingos Abrantes




Fernando Blanqui Teixeira



Octávio Pato



Raimundo Cabral



Sérgio Vilargues



Zita Seabra



Jaime Felix



Luisa Araújo

6362

CSO: 3542/21

IGLESIAS ON OPERATIVE RESULTS OF RECENT PCE CONGRESS

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 6-12 Jan 84 pp 6-7

[Interview with Gerardo Iglesias]

[Text] [Question] After the 9th Congress, is our party prepared to carry out and effective policy and do an effective job in Spanish society?

[Answer] We are in rather better shape than we have been in the past. In the first place, because the whole pre-congress process absorbed part of the party's energies in that same debate. Now, with that discussion resolved and an appropriate policy decided, we are ready to give all our strength to applying that policy. I also believe that the party is in a better position for the actual content of the congress's decisions; a policy of renewal was approved, a policy of deepening party democracy, of participation by the rank and file, of making the party's position toward society more accessible, opening it to the return of many thousands of members, and I think that at the same time this renewed plan will make it possible for new members, above all youths, women, professionals, to come to us... In the whole policy approved at the 9th Congress, there is an effort to interpret the practical policy in the most open way, there is an effort to consider new social phenomena, an effort to encourage those social movements that are appearing and are necessary: the struggle for peace, feminism, ecology, and so forth. And finally, it is the offer to Spanish society of an alternative, because in this country there is a lack of political change.

[Question] Change that is not coming from the government...

[Answer] No, it is not developing a policy of real change. I believe the 9th Congress, without yet being able to go any deeper into some important matters, offers a message of youth and renewal based on the reaffirmation of the communist character of the party and the strengthening of its class position. On this line we are going to throw ourselves into work with the masses, and, in my opinion, are in good shape to achieve the party's recovery.

One premise is missing, and I take this opportunity to call upon all members: normalize the life of the party. And when I say normalize, I do not mean

that the differences are settled; no, the differences remain, there is still debate. But normal debate, which in no way takes away from daily practice and work.

[Question] Are you confident that in today's situation, compatibility will be possible with one thing and another [sic]?

[Answer] After the 9th Congress, there is no reason why differing directions or work should continue. It has been a democratic congress, I do not think anyone questions that; a direction has been chosen, a policy approved, and now we must apply it. I trust that everyone will act in accordance with what is everyone's responsibility.

A Central Committee has been chosen through an effort at integration, in the sense that those present represented the broadest spread of the party in its various positions as well as with regard to where they came from in society. There has been an important renewal in the direction of strengthening the Central Committee with working-class leaders, which is fundamental to connect the party with a key social area, the factories.

Working outside these defined coordinates in the congress and taking another stand would not only be unjustifiable, but I am convinced that it would be massively rejected by the party.

[Question] Are you somewhat afraid of those who intend to be an alternative to the PCE for the Left?

[Answer] Clearly I am not afraid that any alternative to us will develop in this country for the Left. I am certain that the most leftist policy that can be carried out in this country has been approved by the 9th Congress. I know that there are many efforts at division or to start something like that, but history itself has demonstrated the invalidity of those efforts and will continue to do so. The unity of the communists must be achieved within the PCE. And this is more valid today than ever given the effort at integration that we are making, so that many different feelings and shadings can coexist within the party. No one asks a communist coming to the party to leave his opinions and differences at the door.

I am not afraid because I think that very few communist things can be accomplished outside the PCE. My greatest concern is domestic normalization, and starting from that point, and I think the rest won't be anything more than heavenly music or flowers.

[Question] Traditionally, the enemy of a communist party is capital, the bourgeoisie. But social reality is growing ever more complex, and political practice requires alliances, often very subtle exercises of support and opposition. Gerardo, whom do we have to face today, whom are we opposing?

[Answer] The PCE has an adversary, which is the Right, the economic, social, financial Right. A Right that controls and manipulates the means of economic

power and which also has in its hands a large share of government power. We are not ignoring the fact that there is a leftist force in the government, but we are not in agreement with its policy and we are opposed to fundamental aspects of it. Always in the direction of seeking a change of policy and of bringing society an alternative that can offer a real change in Spain.

[Question] The possibility of changes in Spain is, whether we want them or not, closely tied to the development of the entire world situation. After the conquest of Grenada, the aggression in Nicaragua, the presence of marines in Lebanon, in short, in that theater of operations, what can we do, how to show ourselves?

[Answer] We can do important things. We are involved in an arms race, in increased international tensions stemming from bloc dynamics, which is extremely dangerous. We must struggle against this dynamism, toward its end. Because this is the clear alternative in the defense of peace and really opening the doors to progress. Because it is exactly this confrontation of the blocs that chills the transforming impulse of the people. And in this sense we can do a great deal. The basic thing, in my opinion, is to create the vastest, broadest, and most active peace movement. A movement which also has a chance of gaining the active membership of such a basic sector of society as youth.

In Spain, and after the 9th Congress, this emerges as one of the immediate tasks of the communists, centering on such points as withdrawal from NATO and the dismantling of U.S. bases, among others. In Europe, this movement has recently achieved great scope, and even has reached the point of affecting the positions of the very governments of the East.

[Question] Gerardo, when we speak of leaving NATO or of closing Yankee bases, we are obliged to offer the citizens a channel to achieve it. Do we have that channel?

[Answer] They are achievements that cannot be planned for the short term, or on a fixed schedule. What must be seen is the importance of such a process. We must note, for example, what the position of the German Social Democratic party was and what their position is today, leaning more toward peace. And that was thanks to the influence of social mobilization. What in actual terms is our channel? Since the movement must be shown to be under way, and we need a permanent active presence in the streets, and by the streets I mean demonstrations, cultural activities, informational meetings in towns and neighborhoods, mass collections of signatures to force a referendum, making the public aware in areas like the university; that is, to make all citizens aware that the basis for defending peace is to withdraw Spain from NATO and also get free from the threat of U.S. bases being used on the surface in international conflicts, without forgetting that it is possible that they might also be used to store atomic weapons. Our method of struggle is to raise the consciousness of the people, and our channel, the thousand formulas that occur to us on the streets or in the institutions where our party has representatives.

[Question] If you will, let us go back again to Spain and enter another area of conflict--labor. The front page of the press has just been given over to something many people believed would never happen again, actual shots being fired by the security forces against worker demonstrations.

[Answer] I do not want to dwell on the bloodshed, but rather we must realize that the basis of the problem is the economic crisis and the treatment it is receiving. I am not going to go back over the debate we had on this subject in the congress, but I will say that we are faced with an economic policy that has not chosen to fight the strike, and this is a great drama from which things like those you have mentioned are derived.

With this policy, plans are made for reconversion but not reindustrialization, jobs are taken away and new ones are not created. In the heart of this is the Spanish Socialist Workers Party which, with a bipartisan strategy which only considers the existence of the AP, and which as a result, turned toward an exclusively or nearly exclusively institutional policy, refuses the participation of the masses. Therefore in the face of every conflict the government takes a stubborn stand, incomprehensible in a leftist party if it really wants to develop a policy of change, since there is not change without mobilization or social participation.

The most serious of consequences may arise from this: in the face of popular mobilizations, they use the same methods as in former times: they fight terrorism with means that are not only illegal but also are an attack on the whole democratic system; the right to freedom of information is so restricted that Xavier Vinader must remain outside our borders...because of all this there must be a restoration of balance in the Left in Spain. A restoration of balance so that the PCE can offer some proposals on the economic situation, international policy, the democratic reform of government, and so forth, which are different and actual changes, and also offer an idea of the distinctive political practice based on social participation as the real agent of change.

[Question] Do you believe that the government is building socialism? Are they laying the foundations of socialism?

[Answer] No, we are clearly facing a government of the Socialist Party, but not a socialist government. It is not making socialist policy, nor a leftist policy. It may have some very progressive characteristics but, for example, its economic policy is very clearly liberal. Its international policy is clearly conservative, subordinated to U.S. and NATO policy. And in much simpler matters for them, such as public freedoms or the abortion law, they show no socialist behavior.

Undoubtedly the Socialist Party's victory was a victory for democracy, since it reveals the will of the majority for change, but in the course of its governmental policy in practice it is not laying the foundation for socialism. Therefore we demand an urgent change of policy, because as long as they frustrate and deceive the expectations raised about that change, they are creating the conditions for a possible step backwards.

8587

CSO: 3548/162

OVERVIEW OF PRE-ELECTION BASQUE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 10 Jan 84 p 6

[Text] In the past, and not-yet-finished, crisis of the Basque Nationalist Party [PNV], two politicians have played the major parts, the only men who are considered leaders within the party: Carlos Garaicoechea and Xabier Arzalluz. Beside them, with them or against them depending on the situation, have been other party members of the first and second rank, who make up the framework of the original PNV "apparatus," which the lendakari have brought carefully to Vitoria.

For many years, Xabin Zubiri, the mustachioed nationalist who has appeared in Zarauz photographs beside Garaicoechea, has been minister of finance of the PNV. We could better say he has been the honored man who has "kept the party's books," some very complex accounts, as complex as the democratic structure of the party. Zubiri, a dealer in fine fabrics in the old section of Bilbao, had the unconditional sympathies of old Ajuriaguerra and is not known to have any particular ideological depths, but has enormous craving for command. In the PNV he passes as one of the "superburukides" who guard the national purity of the movement; therefore he is president of the editorial board of the official publication DEIA, which in the Garaicoechea-Arzalluz conflict has placed itself unquestionably on the side of the president of Euskadi Buru Batzar.

Advisors

As classical a part of the PNV as Xabin Zubiri is Luis Maria Retolaza, another of the great favorites of Ajuriaguerra and the present advisor on the Interior to the Vitoria government. He may continue in that post, although the advisors surrounding Garaicoechea know perfectly well--and tell the lendakari--that Retolaza is a rigid disciplinarian who has exerted all possible influence to force Garaicoechea once again to accept party discipline. Retolaza, a negotiator and solid, controls, by himself and through his allies, the powerful superstructure of the party. For a time he worked in a family chrome-plating business, but today he throws himself body and soul into setting up the domestic security of the autonomous

community and decisively influencing every party action. Retolaza is the authority in DEIA and in Bilbao, where he lives, he is known for his implacability when he expresses his opinions. In him, Xabier Arzalluz had an unadorned watchdog who applies with particular seriousness and efficiency the maxim that has been so successful in the Basque Nationalist Party: "What cannot be controlled is destroyed."

Sanhedrin

Nevertheless it is not so clear that the "controllers" of the big shots of the "Sanhedrin" have really tried to get rid of Garaicoechea. It is unclear because if they had wanted to they would have finished the job with greater success in a short period of time. However, they and the PNV are working for eternity. Other men of the second rank, some nevertheless of greater worth, are busy with more earthly tasks. For example, the conciliator Mikel Unzueta, a well-known lawyer from Bilbao, who was a senator in Madrid and who has never wanted to dedicate himself (and this is his strength) full time to politics, gives advice under a shadow of noninvolvement since in past days he has been one of the promoters of the "third way," a course between Arzalluz and Garaicoechea which when all is said and done, has served to unite what had been essentially separated by one man: the president of Euskadi Buru Batzar. Unzueta, accustomed to the negotiating methods he used daily in the days of the UCD, has this time been an important pawn in the subtle arrangement achieved in Zarauz. It is said of Unzueta that he always plays to win: Who is he playing with this time? Experts think it is with Arzalluz, so that it must be doubted whether the victory of the lendakari can be something other than a Pyrrhic one

The "Cuerda" Case

Strangely, after Garaicoechea's resignation was made official, the Basque Country media that was not religiously nationalist began using the "Cuerda chance" as a possible solution to the lendakari "scare." Cuerda is a lawyer from Vitoria, a good mayor and a better promoter, who is only a recent member of the PNV and who nevertheless has won credit in the party and in his capital thanks to the fact that he simply does things well. Cuerda came to the PNV from the Christian Democratic Party, although apparently in his youth his political ideals were closer to the National Movement--I mean the Spanish, because in the other, in the PNV's little one, today Jose Angel Cuerda moves about with greater coherence and ability in spite of the fact that his acquaintance with euskera is still young. Cuerda travelled last week from Vitoria to Bilbao innumerable times, carrying written messages from Garaicoechea and Arzalluz from one city to another. In case there should be some doubt about his role, he soon waived the possibility of substitution, and in case his journeys should be interpreted wrongly, Cuerda quickly stated that he has not the slightest intention of aspiring to the "Lendakarinato" [leadership].

Loyalty

The job has actually had few aspirants, mainly because no one believed that Garaicoechea would leave Ajuria Enea as he threatened. Not even in

Guipuzcoa, a region where--in the peculiar geographic-political terminology of the PNV--the Buskadi Buru Batzar has received little response in its undisguised intention of demanding loyalty to Garaicoechea. Gerardo Bujanda, former deputy to the parliament in Madrid, is considered a supporter of Xabier Arzalluz, works hard in the party ever since he quit working for a company linked to another great nationalist, Luzurriaga. Bujanda and Joseba Leizaola, congressman in Vitoria and nephew of Garaicoechea's predecessor, Luis Maria Leizaola, have had brief prominence in the conflict, know-it-alls of the fact that the Guipuzcoa rank and file were unconditionally working on the Garaicoechea front. In Guipuzcoa, deputy Andoni Monforte (a maketo on his father's side) has officially refused to return to Madrid in the next legislature, because his statements against the nationalist "apparatus" will be carefully watched for in Bilbao, in the PNV's private hemeroteca. Monforte has been more daring than the spokesman in Madrid, Marcos Vizcaya, who was officially in flight during all the days of caution, away from his residence in Bilbao.

Pamplona

Koldo Amezketa has remained in harness in Pamplona. Delegate of the Basque government in Navarre, he was freed by the party for such an encouraging job. The attempt in the Zarauz assembly of side-stepping any sort of prior discussion and move urgently ahead to the voting for Garaicoechea is attributed to Koldo Amezketa. Amezketa, a law student when his obligations as ambassador to Navarre allow it, has had unconditional and unblemished support in the lendakari. He was the one Garaicoechea called for on that happy morning of the press conference. Many others from the three provinces of the community have been more lukewarm, in order not to compromise their futures, but the future started Saturday for Garaicoechea.

8587

CS0: 3548/162

PSOE FEDERAL COMMITTEE FOCUSES ON REGIONAL ELECTIONS

Madrid YA in Spanish 16 Jan 84 p 8

[Article by F. L. de Pablo: "PSOE: Confusion Between Control, Executive Organs"]

[Text] Self-satisfaction and the absence of any internal criticism prevailed at the meeting of the Federal Committee of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] yesterday, Saturday. There was also concern that the coming elections in Euskadi and Catalonia not mean a reduction in votes for the socialist hegemony but its consolidation in all regions.

The party plans to use all the resources in its reach to achieve a "presentable" showing in the Basque Country and to win in Catalonia. Therefore, there must not be any sign of criticism of the actions of the government party by the Federal Committee. It is necessary to close ranks to maintain internal unity between the party and government.

Incompatibilities

Theoretically, the Federal Committee is the organ that controls the actions of the Executive Committee and the latter controls the actions of the government. However, there are people holding positions at different territorial levels on the Federal Committee, Executive Committee and in the government at the same time. Therefore, the members of the management and control organs are sometimes the same people that should be controlled by them. This makes it difficult for the Executive Committee to criticize the actions of the government or the Federal Committee to criticize the Executive Committee. In any case, with the self-discipline of the left, the criticism stays inside.

That situation of the control organs' dependency on the organs of execution instead of the reverse is not only found in the Federal Executive Committee where nine of its most important members are in the government. Also 90 percent of the members on the Federal Committee hold executive positions at different territorial levels. At times there are extreme circumstances; a secretary general might be vice president of an autonomous government, a parliamentarian in the assembly and a national senator all at the same time. If the incompatibilities that the government has dictated for deputies and senators were applied to these situations, there would be more independence for the control organs, according to a prominent socialist.

This dependency between organs means greater homogeneity in the party and unity in action, as Alfonso Guerra emphasized yesterday. He compared this to the bad impression the fratricidal fights of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] had on the people. However, it also tends to suppress criticism within the party, confuse desires with reality and create an endogamous political class that will eventually--if its hegemony lasts--convert the PSOE into a closed organization. The beck and call of the hierarchy will replace internal democracy. This could result in a Francoist sociologist legitimated by the ballot boxes like Pio Cabanillas of the original UCD tried to do.

We have evidence of that tendency to become an "institutional party" in the Executive Committee's administration report which Felipe Gonzalez read to the Federal Committee. In it he again insisted that there is no alternative to the PSOE as Alfonso Guerra indicated in his idyllic analysis of society's satisfaction with the government. The disparity between the analyses of the PSOE experts and those recorded in the independent mass media could be debated by comparing them with reality. Even though the vice president of the government is not too concerned that the voters do not have an alternative, perhaps the voters will not be as indifferent when they see that the hegemonist desires of the government party deprive them of the first right guaranteed by democracy: the right to choose among different options.

Party Depends on Government

Nevertheless, that same report by Felipe Gonzalez emphasizes that the relationship between the government and the party is not best for the party. He said: "The function of the party should be noted." It is not only a PSOE problem; it happens to all parties that reach power. Remember the recent crisis of the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party]. However, it becomes worse if the party is in complete power. The situation of dependency between the organs of execution and control stifles any criticism from the members or the man in the street and tends to nullify the presence of the party in society. There is also the problem that the government is and should be for all Spaniards. It needs to act independently of the party. In the search for that balance, the party at times gets lost since government action is not always identified as the action of the party that supports it in Parliament.

At this time the attrition that a year of government, especially the debatable administration of some ministers, can mean for the party is being discussed in many socialist groups. However, Guerra said that attrition is not apparent anywhere. Not only is the action of the national government being discussed but the actions of the governments of the autonomous communities. That criticism is resolved within the party organs, giving it an outward image of discipline and unity. However, this prevents the Federal Committee--top organ of control between congresses--from exercising its disciplinary function because it would weaken the image of monolithic discipline in the party and the government.

This situation will continue for now although there are plans to propose an amendment to the statutes at the next party congress in order to establish incompatibilities between party positions and government positions. This would prevent having those controlled becoming, in turn, the controllers and insure internal democracy instead of monolithic hierarchical or "economic" dependency.

POLITICAL OVERVIEW OF UPCOMING CATALAN ELECTIONS

Madrid ABC in Spanish 16 Jan 84 p 20

[Text] Barcelona--The proximity of the Catalan autonomous elections has heated up the climate of political confrontation among the Catalan parties. They are finalizing their strategies now. One obvious sign of this is the statements made this weekend by Convergence politician Miguel Roca. They focused on the socialist candidate, Ramon Obiols, who, according to him, "is nervous and jittery and does not offer a positive alternative."

Obiols was touring several cities and towns in Gerona, proclaiming his "Tarradellas" inspiration. According to the PSC [Socialist Party of Catalonia]-PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] candidate, "The Generalitat, during Tarradellas' time, was more united." Meanwhile in Barcelona, Miguel Roca spent his time shooting darts at Obiols. He stated that the PSC candidate "loses his nerve too easily and campaigns by sharp, personalized, nervous and jittery criticism without offering a positive, constructive message for a concrete alternative." The spokesman for the Catalan Minority in the Congress of Deputies even gave advice to Obiols: "I suggest that he have more self-confidence." He used his contacts with the press to recall how poorly the transfers have gone under the socialist government. This was undoubtedly an attempt to use the differences that arose between the government and the Generalitat 6 months ago concerning the latest transfers of services to the autonomous community.

ERC Does Not Like AP

Another campaign issue appeared yesterday, Sunday, with the ERC [Republican Left of Catalonia], the third largest party in number of representatives in the Catalan Parliament. In addition to planning and finalizing its strategy for the spring elections, the ERC Council agreed to oppose any government in Catalonia in which the AP [Popular Alliance] participated.

Also the Executive Council headed by the charismatic Heribert Barrera came to an agreement that could have vast repercussions on the party in the coming months. The repeated criticisms recently against the ERC leadership by some local leaders and members in the so-called "renovator" sector have been taken care of by Barrera and his clique of advisers. They ousted Jaume Naulart and other "critical" members. Although the ERC leadership stated--after announcing

this decision--that these expulsions did not create any danger of schism in the party, the truth is that the development of events in this Catalan group leads to the assumption that the criticism of the renovators will not be silenced by this purge. At the last party congress, the renovators won about 50 percent of the votes. Situated to the left of Barrera, they have criticized the government pact with the CiU [expansion unknown]. They feel the party is getting away from its original inspiration and propose withdrawing support from Pujol. They also advocate forming a Catalan bloc with the Leftist Nationalists for the coming elections.

One of the curiosities or interesting notes in this campaign is the emergence of a slate headed by a woman. Angelica Gomez Rueda apparently will head the slate of the so-called Spanish Democratic Party. This group's statement of principles includes: "to defend progressive freedom and equality."

7717

CSO: 3548/168

DELAYS IN PURCHASE OF 2,500 JEEPS FOR ARMY

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 17 Jan 84 p 3

[Article by Michel Mathot: "Two Billion Francs for 2,500 Jeeps"]

[Text] In 1980, the National Defense Ministry was authorized to solicit bids for the purchase of 2,500 light cross-country wheeled vehicles for the armed forces. The government elected, at the time, to follow a "private contract" procedure that allows the defense minister to go ahead with the purchase after having sought the opinion of competent authorities, particularly the COC (Government Contracts Advisory and Coordinating Committee) and the Finance Inspectorate.

The COC issued its opinion in October 1983. This meant the matter was theoretically settled. Thus nothing prevented Defense Minister Vreven from entering into the contract. Yet he still has not made up his mind to do so. In fact, he has twice asked the bidders to extend the valid period of their proposals. The second extension expires at the end of this month.

Does this postponement after postponement mean that the military will soon have to relearn how to travel by bicycle, or by taxi as in 1914 when moving up to the Marne?

On the surface, this contract is relatively simple. It involves replacing the army's fleet of light tactical wheeled vehicles. The current fleet is some 20 to 30 years old. It is consequently expensive to maintain and dubiously cost effective.

Hence the 1980 decision to solicit bids for the purchase of 2,500 "cross-country" vehicles. At that time, the principle of linkage ("globalisation") had not yet been applied to large military equipment contracts. As a result, the subtle interplay of regional and [Flemish and Walloon] communal balances with respect to offsets was theoretically not even a factor.

An Obviously Large Contract

At 600,000 to 700,000 francs--exclusive of VAT [value-added tax]--per vehicle, this contract amounts to approximately 2 billion francs. The government authorized the defense minister to solicit bids and handle the purchase as a private contract, in other words to go ahead as soon as he was able to determine the best quality-to-cost ratio for his purchase.

The armed forces then proceeded to get into the act. They specified what they wanted and solicited bids from some dozen manufacturers. Eventually three manufacturers proposed a vehicle meeting the prescribed military specifications.

The three firms submitting proposals were Land Rover, Bombardier, and Mercedes. Land Rover is represented in Belgium by the firm of Beherman Demoen. It proposed a vehicle derived directly from those already being used by the Belgian Army. But, as required, this new version has four-wheel drive.

Bombardier, a Canadian company, proposed the Iltis vehicle which is actually the jeep made by Volkswagen for the German Army. Bombardier has purchased a license to produce the Iltis.

Mercedes proposed a vehicle produced in Austria by Daimler-Benz.

Extensive field tests were initiated while the bidding firms began to prepare their respective economic offset packages that have to accompany the contract.

Love at First Sight

The military's preference very quickly became known. They want the Mercedes. Not, as some have slyly insinuated, because it is more "limousine like"--a jeep is a jeep after all--but because it is more to their liking. Love at first sight cannot be argued away. It's similar to what happens at an auto show.

The military would not have the Land Rover at any price. They felt it was somewhat like their old vehicles, even though it is a four-wheel drive version. They considered its design to be too old, even though it is still an excellent vehicle. They cannot disregard the fact that the army sometimes keeps its vehicles 20 to 30 years. Finding themselves, beyond the year 2000, with vehicles whose basic design dates back to the 1960's, or indeed even earlier, was simply more than senior military authorities could bear.

Actually, Land Rover does produce vehicles of much more modern design but these do not fit the contract's specifications.

As for the Iltis, its situation was somewhat different. The proposed vehicle is of more modern design and has proved itself in the Bundeswehr. When the Canadians submitted their bid, however, they were represented in Belgium by an exclusively civilian consortium with which the Defense Ministry was not accustomed to dealing, whereas the exact opposite is true with the Mercedes industrial group. This is a very important consideration when 20 years of assured supply and maintenance are involved.

In a nutshell, all factors concurred to make the Mercedes vehicle the military's must, and especially as the Canadian-proposed price was sharply higher.

Slanted Tests Boomerang

Everything was going so smoothly that the military became somewhat cavalier with the rules governing administration of the field tests. They emphasized enforcement of those rules that favored their preferred vehicle. For example, the Canadians, unaccustomed to the routine of these procedures, presented for the tests a vehicle with tires of a size other than prescribed in the military specifications. This slightly altered the vehicle's ground clearance. It also triggered a few demurrers of no real significance: bang! one demerit for the Canadian entry.

Some of the Belgian Army's old Land Rovers had experienced a few structural problems. These were reflected in the observations made on the tests of the new vehicles. Consequently Beherman Demoen, Land Rover's Belgian representative, had good reason to later label such action as disgraceful.

Contrastingly, the military readily "overlooked" certain details unfavorable to Mercedes, including the use of an automatic choke prohibited by the specifications. This choke would allegedly cause the engine to backfire.

In short, although we need not call such actions disgraceful, it is conceivable, however, that the rigorous tests were perhaps evaluated with sheep's eyes. Nothing is more tender-hearted than an amorous warrior, as Shakespeare said.

The first bombshell out of the blue was the strong protest registered by Beherman Demoen against a Mercedes advertisement that somewhat prematurely announced that company's selection for the jeep contract. Upon Land Rover's petition, a court issued an injunction against further publication of the litigious advertisement. At the same time, Beherman Demoen resumed its campaign to gain the contract by issuing a series of strong public statements.

The Canadians, unaccustomed to the jolly subtleties of our government purchasing and contracting procedures, had already withdrawn, convinced that they had no chance. But Beherman Demoen's action prompted them to reconsider. So they likewise rejoined the fray by offering new prices plus additional and higher offset proposals. The other candidates then followed their example.

... in the Defense Ministry. Would it now have to reopen a thoroughly 'wrapped-up' contract award that had been transmitted to the Ministry of Finance and the COC for approval, and with which everyone was apparently satisfied?

As most of the Land Rover offsets went to Flanders, Walloon politicians had little interest in supporting the Land Rover bid, even though it was in Wallonia that Beherman Demoen would place its additional offsets.

Moreover, while the Mercedes offsets were clearly more advantageous to Wallonia, the prospect of a big contract for the Van Hool auto body-building firm and the distribution of offsets to a very large number of companies throughout the country, north and south, were viewed as good points in favor of the German firm by northern politicians who, furthermore, were being pressured by the military lobby.

The Defense Ministry found an answer to its dilemma. The contract dossier had been forwarded to the COC on 11 July and was, therefore, considered closed as of that date. Accordingly all subsequent price and offset proposals could no longer be taken into consideration.

A 'Flawed' Opinion

When the COC, after meeting three times, issued its opinion on 17 October, it had no choice but to take into account the dossier it had before it and concur in the selection of Mercedes. So it concurred, but not without pointing out that it was not deluded about the game it was being made to play. The Finance Inspectorate took the same position.

Actually everybody knew full well that the situation had changed, that the prices had been changed, and that the total value of the offsets had been increased.

What explanation is there for the fact that a private contract procedure designed precisely as a means of getting a "good deal" for the government by flexibly exploiting competition, had produced the opposite effect.

Defense Minister Vreven tried to argue that the process really had to stop somewhere and that if we retracted contracts when they were actually being considered by the COC, we would never buy anything again.

He was politely told in rebuttal that there was, nevertheless, no need to "exaggerate" and that the new proposals had been received in time to be taken into account.

The defense minister then tried to get his cabinet colleagues to help him. They told him to shift for himself like a grown-up should. He clearly would have liked to please his military, but this desire was not enough to prompt him to make a decision single-handedly on what was now such a controversial matter.

So he asked the manufacturers to extend their proposals 2 months. As this extension's expiration date of 31 December neared, he still had not found the solution. In discussions with his fellow cabinet members about the purchase of helicopters--another fine free-for-all in the offing--he tried to find one or more allies. It was a wasted effort. So at the last minute he was forced to ask for a further extension of 1 month. This second extension expires on 31 January. This whole affair is starting to become highly comical. Thus unless Vreven wants to be considered a good-time Charlie once again, he will have to come to some decision within the very next few days.

A Triple Choice

What can Vreven do?

a. He could follow the COC's advice and designate Mercedes as planned. To do this, however, he would have to obtain the support of his colleagues because he would now no longer dare to make such a decision by himself.

b. He could decide, likewise with the consensus of the cabinet, to reopen part of the dossier to reappraise it in the light of the new price and offset proposals.

c. The third solution would be to forget the whole affair and start from scratch again. But this would really be the least admirable approach. It would also make the military howl.

For the time being, the "amended" status of the bids for the delivery of 2,500 vehicles is as follows. The unit price now stands below the 700,000-Belgian franc mark, exclusive of VAT. Mercedes has a somewhat higher price than Iltis which has dramatically cut its price. Land Rover remains clearly less costly than the other two. It should be noted that from a military standpoint all three vehicles meet the prescribed specifications. The Mercedes and the Iltis perform more competently than the Land Rover. The latter has higher fuel consumption than the other two but does offer the advantage of being in the same maintenance line as the Belgian Army's present vehicle inventory, thereby permitting continued use of existing stocks of spare parts.

Offset levels are high for all three vehicles. For Land Rover, they are now 150 percent: 30 percent in "direct" offsets (i.e. work in Belgium on the contract proper) and 120 percent in "indirect" offsets (i.e. work in Belgium of an equivalent technical level). The direct offsets would go to Beherman's Malines plant and provide 20 to 30 new jobs. Beherman wants to maintain and even raise the level of activity at its main Malines plant which still has some 40 employees to tide it over until it receives the armored-vehicle assembly contract promised by Vickers. This work will not begin until a few years from now, however.

A large part of the indirect offsets--approximately 1.8 billion francs--would go to Bekaert for steel wire to be produced for Dunlop, a British firm. In addition, a series of purchase orders would also be placed with companies in southern Belgium.

The "return" of Bombardier--now represented in Belgium by Ieteren--raised this Canadian company's offsets to more than 200 percent. These would include the purchase from Brugeoise and Nivelles of more than 1 billion francs worth of equipment for the New York subway system, new purchases of Volkswagens on the Belgian market, firm orders placed with FN [National Arms Manufacturing Company] for 7.62-caliber Minimi light machine guns for the Canadian Government, Canadian offsets reassigned to the Belgian market, etc.

Assembly work would be done in either the Brussels VW plant or the Limbourg LAG plant. The "communal" distribution of these offsets is obviously less oriented northward than the Land Rover offsets. It also gives Brussels a share.

At the last minute, Mercedes also reached the 200-percent offset mark by including for Brugeoise and Nivelles an order from Euclid, a former Mercedes subsidiary recently sold to Clark by Daimler Benz.

Like the Bombardier proposal, the level of direct offsets in the Mercedes proposal is relatively modest, the bulk of the offsets being indirect.

In the case of Mercedes, however, the offsets are distributed on the whole over a large number of companies. In the opinion of some Belgians this is advantageous because of the resultant flexibility, diversification, and lasting flow of business.

Also noted among the Mercedes offsets is a probable 800-million franc order to be placed with Van Hool, an auto body-building firm, for the delivery of double-decker buses and minibuses to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

All of this has led "observers" to say that if the defense minister does decide to reappraise the proposals, Bombardier and Mercedes are now neck and neck when their respective advantages and disadvantages are examined from various angles. This depends, of course, on whether, and under what conditions, the proposals are reappraised. We should find out very soon now.

8041

CSO: 3619/26

ECONOMIC UPTURN EXPECTED FOR 1984

Zurich ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 21 Jan 84 p 15

/Article by T.H., Amsterdam/

/Text/ Real growth of industrial production, higher capacity utilization and more positive expectations for better sales prospects in most economic sectors are the most important reasons that support the view that the Netherlands climbed out of the cyclical trough during the second half of 1983. Hopes are now for the upturn to continue because economic growth abroad should have a favorable effect on exports and because investments have once again started to expand.

In its recently published third-quarter 1983 report, the central bank reached the conclusion that the cyclical upswing is going to continue. Industrial production increased by two percent during the period under review. Amro-Bank's business cycle analysts estimate that the GNP will grow at an annual rate of one percent. Fewer businesses see a need for production cutbacks due to a lack of demand; prospects for new orders are more positive and manufacturing facilities are utilized to about 80 percent of capacity. A Chamber of Commerce survey reveals that, in 1983, business in real terms has not shrunk in the Dutch economy for the first time in 10 years.

Bigger Current Account Surplus

A search for the underlying causes of the recovery makes it clear that increased exports are the most important explanation. With a one-percent decline in export prices, a 9 billion guilder increase in exports to around 186 billion guilders means a five percent export expansion. Hence, during the first nine months of 1983, the current account surplus reached 11.2 billion guilders compared with 8.9 billion guilders during the same period last year. The strength of the guilder did not have a negative effect on its position abroad since wage costs rose only slightly and the rate of inflation stayed low.

The increased export demand evidently stimulated production to a larger extent than the government's financial relief programs. During the period when there was no improvement in sales opportunities, few new investments were made; instead

business used that time to increase its profits. To the extent that investments were made, they were replacements for existing machines. No new equipment was added; expenditures for plants and transportation equipment fell. While investments in the public sector were cut by 2.5 percent, those in the private sector (including state-owned industries) expanded by 2.5 percent.

The third demand component, private consumption, remained a weak link in the cyclical trend. Over the course of the year, private consumption declined by one percent; the reason that this decline wasn't any more drastic was that consumers made more use of their savings.

Lower Wages for Less Working Hours

Whatever cut into private disposable income improved the earnings of industry. Nominally, hourly wage rates before taxes grew by only 1.9 percent. Although last year's reduction of working hours had been designed to fight unemployment, it did not produce the hoped-for result. The reduction of working hours, financed from inflation adjustment withholdings, seems to enjoy increasing popularity in the business community. Some 71 percent of all employees have accepted labor contracts which, in most instances, cover a two-year period and provide for a 5 percent cut in working hours at the end of the contract period.

No Ray of Hope

The annual average of unemployed persons increased to 797,000, compared with 542,000 a year earlier, i.e., 17 percent of the workforce. The slower rise in employment can hardly be considered a hopeful sign because, even if this trend continues, it will be very difficult to find ways of getting down from the 19 percent jobless rate expected for 1984. Although demographic changes, which mean more people in the workforce, are the most crucial factor, the failure to stop the net loss in the number of jobs intensifies the imbalance between the supply of, and demand for, work. In 1983, the work volume dropped by 100,000 to 4.5 million work years. Only agriculture and fishing continued to expand; all other sectors needed less workers, including, for the first time, the government. Such high unemployment is unacceptable in the long run, not only from the social, but also from the financial point of view. The Statistical Office points out that, primarily as a result of higher unemployment, the share of jobless benefits has now risen to 37.6 percent of the national income (compared with 35.3 percent last year).

Clashes over Austerity Measures

The government has made attempts to put an end to this growing burden by making deep cuts in the social welfare system and by reducing government salaries. Plans to cut salaries by 3.5 percent starting January 1, 1984 led to large-scale strikes between October and early December of last year, but the government had to make only minor concessions. Essentially it got the necessary support to carry out its austerity measures. As for the budget deficit, it seems to have been easy last year to stay below the 10.8 percent target. It is estimated that new debts stayed within 10 percent. They were financed via the capital market without any ill effects. The disappointing results of the government's first bond issue this year indicates that it will be more difficult for the finance ministry in 1984 to fill the till.

The Dominant Role of Government

This year again, the government played a dominant role in capital markets. Altogether, bond issues totaling 32.9 billion guilders (compared to 25.8 billion guilders the year before) were listed at the Amsterdam Exchange. Of that total, the government accounted for some 23.5 billion guilders, or 72 percent; that is over 30 percent more than in 1982. Bonds floated by banks, industry and trade came to 3.7 (2.7) billion guilders; foreign issues totaled 2.6 (2.3) billion guilders. Bonds and savings certificates totaled 2.4 (2.2) billion guilders. The stock market showed a robust upward trend; with 59.9 billion guilders, sales shot up by 121 percent over last year. With 131 points, the share index reached a record level, surpassing the 1983 mark of 130.2 points. This trend was interrupted when the finance minister issued the memorandum last spring which underscored the state's high financial deficit. But international signals indicating economic recovery, led to a resumption of the upward movement which continued to the end of the year. Algemene Bank Nederland projections are for lower interest rates in capital markets because of the absence of any impulse for higher interest rates from abroad, because economic recovery will make it easier to fund the state budget and because inflation is expected to remain at the low 2.8 percent level of 1983.

7821

CSO: 3620/145

BACKGROUND OF INVESTIGATION INTO SADOLHAO COOPERATIVE

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Dec 83 p 6

/Article by Joaquim Vieira/

/Text/ Ferreira Marques, Secretary of State for Fisheries Faria dos Santos' administrative assistant, told EXPRESSO that the secretary decided not to request an investigation of the Sadolhao cooperative of Setubal, although such an investigation had been considered.

It should be recalled that EXPRESSO's next to last edition reported that Faria dos Santos was getting ready to order a judicial investigation of that company. This was corroborated by a source at the State Secretariat for Fisheries

According to Ferreira Marques, Faria dos Santos reportedly made his final decision after he learned there were several lawsuits pending in Setubal district involving Sadolhao and opted for the principle of government non-interference in the judicial process.

The Sadolhao management, in turn, explained in a letter it sent to EXPRESSO that, "under the terms of the civil suit code, only the shareholders can demand that a judicial inquiry be made of the cooperative."

Moreover, contrary to what was reported 2 weeks ago, EXPRESSO has learned that the Secretary of State for Labor, Custodio Simoes, has already left his position as vice president of Sadolhao. He is now an alternate member of the administrative bodies.

As a matter of fact, the fish canning cooperative changed management in March when industry specialists took the reins. Joao da Costa Pereira, who is part of the new management team, told EXPRESSO that "the lack of confidence in the cooperative because it did not have technical expertise" had been the government's earlier justification for not unblocking the situation. However, this is no longer the case. The Sadolhao management underscores in its letter that "the present situation resulted from a legally held election in a general assembly, so that its actions are completely legal."

General State Budget Subsidy

Sadolhao was founded in 1975 after the facilities of the firm Joao C Gargalo Herdeiros Lda were taken over. Jacob Palma, whom we mentioned in our previous report, is a managing partner although he has a minority holding.

The firm was involved in marketing foodstuffs after it closed two fish canning factories in 1972. The cooperative's management says that "it can be verified that the company was in technical bankruptcy in 1974."

After the takeover, the cooperative opened one of the factories (in Olhao) and requested funds from the government to modernize the Setubal facility. An open ended subsidy was granted to Sadolhao in 1978 totalling 60,000 contos for the purchase of new equipment. This money, which was included in that year's general state budget, was reportedly never transferred to the Union of Portuguese Banks /UBP/. In the meantime, UBP had begun to loan money to the cooperative because of the government guarantee.

Up to 1980, the company completed several expansion projects at the facilities (which included the construction of a group of large size refrigeration chambers) and purchased modern canning equipment from Denmark. However, the government did not guarantee its recovery plans in 1980. Somewhat contradictorily, that same government (the first Democratic Alliance government) also reportedly set aside a new 25,000 conto subsidy for Sadolhao.

The cooperative, which had closed the Olhao factory in the meantime, was thus paralyzed with the construction almost finished and all the equipment (very technologically advanced and now worth more than 100,000 contos) still under customs seal at its facilities.

Cross Lawsuits

Meanwhile, two parallel lawsuits had been in the courts since 1979. One suit was brought by the former owners against the cooperative and the other by the cooperative against the company. The land originally owned by the company was being disputed. Because of the expansion undertaken since the takeover, the land in question is only a part of the area currently occupied by Sadolhao in Setubal.

Custodio Simoes and nine other new members of the cooperative took over its management in October 1982. According to a witness contacted by EXPRESSO, it was at this time that the management reportedly began casting about for a 45,000 conto subsidy from the labor ministry. No prior agreement had been reached on such a subsidy, however. Nevertheless, the current administrators say "it is not true, there was no intention /to obtain a subsidy/. The cooperative had only requested a 3,000 conto subsidy from the labor ministry. This request was made before those people became members and it was refused."

The management also says that it was not notified of any pending lawsuit being brought by former cooperative members, although another source mentioned to EXPRESSO that two suits were being brought against the new cooperative members by someone who worked in the Olhao factory.

Management also denies knowing about any lawsuit being brought against the cooperative by the UBP. It confirms, however, that the total debt to that bank (including interest) is more than 100,000 contos and maintains these commitments should be settled by the government.

According to the management, "a technical-economic study was recently presented to the bank and all government agencies directly or indirectly connected with this matter which shows the cooperative to be completely viable."

"Partial" Assessor

Management claims, however, that a relative of Jacob Palma who is also a former employee of the old firm is an assessor at the Secretariat of State for Fisheries. He reportedly prepares negative reports on the plans to put the factory in operation and thus blocks having them put in effect. The management says it has already informed the secretary of state for fisheries that this person is not the most appropriate one to advise on this matter. However, up till now, it appears to have had no visible effect.

"We do not understand why tens of thousand contos worth of equipment is rotting away without a government order being issued to give the firm access to funds to get the factory in operation," says Joao Costa Pereira. "The debt would be recovered in a short time."

Jacob Palma reveals in a letter to EXPRESSO that he has already had (unproductive) meetings with members of the cooperative. "They proposed an unacceptable agreement because it implied an association between the victims (us, the legitimate and legal owners) and the despoilers (the former and the new cooperative members)."

"Restitution to Joao C Gargalo Herdeiro Lda of its legally owned property," the letter continues, "will be decided by the courts having jurisdiction on this matter or administratively, when the government finally has the courage to act like a state of law."

Sadolhao's current capital of 1,500 contos has been completely raised, according to management.

9935

CSO: 8142/0554-B

NEW DRILLING, OIL PRODUCTION RESEARCH CENTER OPENS

Paris AFP SCIENCES in French No 383, 22 Dec 83 pp 3-6

/Excerpts from speeches at the inauguration of new French research center/

/Excerpts/ St-Remy-les-Chevreuse--"model center for opening the door to advanced technology," "showcase of French oil technology," Mr Laurent Fabius, minister of research and industry, expressed very high praise when he inaugurated the Total group's new Beauplan "drilling and production" research center at St-Remy-les-Chevreuse (Yvelines) on 19 December.

"I noted that the Beauplan center devotes a part of its research to assisted oil recovery. It is indeed one of the most effective tools to insure the success of oil research."

"It is particularly necessary to ensure the technological progress of French companies in the oil sector since the area of good returns from mining has somewhat shifted. For new oil, it lies primarily in the domains of engineering and computation services. The fact that our oil-related sector has become the first among French export sectors, with an excess of FF 45 billion in 1982, shows well enough the lead taken by our firms in this area. Adaptation to crises and problems comes necessarily through the door open to the future. There are no "technological fixed revenues." Research and development efforts must be "constantly started over again," Mr Fabius said.


As for Rene Granier de Lilliac, chief executive of the French Petroleum Company, he explained the reasons for selecting Beauplan.

"For everything that concerns such a vast and diversified array of production techniques, it appeared desirable to develop and concentrate the various work centers that so far had been scattered around Paris, in one single site, adapted to the new requirements of our research activities."

"Thus we had to select Beauplan," FPC's chief executive said, "to remain close to the outside organizations with which the Group is in contact: IFP /French Petroleum Institute/, CNRS /National Center for Scientific Research/, universities, major graduate schools...and close to the operating exploration and production facilities.

"Furthermore," he added, "it is easily accessible to foreign visitors staying in Paris to whom we want to show our scientific investigation resources."

The Beauplan Center: A Flexible, Decentralized Organization



Key:

1. Drilling laboratories
2. Production laboratories
3. Training
4. Drilling ease
5. Fluids and cement
6. Petrophysics--Field fluids
7. Assisted recovery--Industrial-process simulation
8. Product treatment--production increase
9. Technology transfer
10. Tool manufacturers
11. Work site activities
12. Data base
13. Pilot plant operations
14. Total Group subsidiaries

15. Exploitation
16. Customers (industrial cooperation)
17. Total FPC exploration laboratory, (33) Pessac
18. Total CFR /French Refining Company/ research center, (76) Gonfreville

/Boxed insert/

The Beauplan laboratory allows Total to regroup in one single location its various laboratories that are specialized in the fields of drilling and oil and gas production. Total's investment in it amounts to FF 90 million.

The work and research done there by approximately 100 engineers and technicians are mainly aimed at improving drilling techniques and tools and at enhancing recovery from hydrocarbon fields.

The laboratory's functions are, on one hand permanent technical assistance to Total work sites all over the world, as well as to other companies outside the group; and, on the other hand, in connection with various scientific public organizations and universities; research-and-development applied to exploration, development and exploitation of hydrocarbon fields. In addition to these functions there are training activities for the Total group's own units as well as for third-party companies, especially national oil companies of countries with whom Total works in close industrial cooperation.

Counting this new research center, the Pessac exploration laboratories (geology) and CERTED (solar energy) inaugurated in succession this year, and counting as well the Gonfreville refining research center, there are in France approximately 1,000 persons devoted to industrial research within the Total group.

/End of boxed insert/

Mr Granier de Lilliac listed the "very precise objectives" that were set by the group's executives when they created the Beauplan center.

"First, we expect to get from it a high productivity on the scientific level, through the integration of the latest techniques available, specially in the field of electronics and automation; and on the social level, through employee participation in defining work assignments."

"Furthermore, the group wants to have at its disposition a tool adapted to its training requirements. This involves not only its own employees but equally those of developing countries. I want to emphasize the international function of this center and hence its role in our policy of industrial cooperation with the Third World. This policy, as you know, is one of the pivots of our strategy."

12260

CSO: 3519/164

NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR SOLAR COLLECTOR SYSTEMS

Milan ENERGIE ALTERNATIVE HTE in Italian Sep-Oct 83 pp 365-370

[Excerpts] In the course of a press conference held in Rome on 21 July, ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] Vice President Dr Marcello Inghilesi officially introduced the "solar water-heater" drive, aimed at promoting the use of solar-energy systems for the production of utility hot water. The press conference was also attended by Professor Giuseppe Ammassari, general manager for energy sources, Ministry of Industry; Professor Fabio Fittipaldi, ENEL board member; and Dr Giorgio Ratti, general manager, BEI (European Investment Bank). In the light of the interest which this initiative will not fail to arouse among designers, builders, and installers working in the solar energy sector as well as among the users of the ENEL themselves, we think that it is a good idea here briefly to report some news pertaining to the significance of this campaign, its technical and financial features, and the activities of an administrative nature that are needed to obtain funding.

As we know, by virtue of Law No 309, of June 1981, ENEL institutionally took over the role of energy operator and was authorized to promote also the more efficient use of energy with its own organization and through suitable incentives.

Three types of action are planned in the civilian sector: Elimination of waste through correct use of equipment already installed; development of equipment functionally similar to equipment currently in use but not producing higher energy yields; substitution of electric energy with renewable energy sources where possible.

This last type of action appears to be particularly indicated because of low-temperature heat uses which in Italy represent 9 percent of the entire ultimate energy consumption volume. As regards the production of hot water for domestic uses, recent surveys indicate that 43 percent of the families have electric water-heaters, 16 percent have gas water-heaters, 22 percent have

systems tied in with environmental heating, while the remaining 19 percent do not have any water heating system.

It thus appears evident that proper and timely action in this sector can bring about the by no means negligible saving of electric energy on the individual and collective levels; this, among other things, runs counter to the energy policies drafted in recent years on the national and community levels.

The "solar water-heater" campaign launched by ENEL is aimed at promoting the installation of utility water heating systems through the use of solar energy captured with the help of collector panels of the more common type featuring liquid circulation.

For this campaign, ENEL will make 54 billion lire available to users. Assuming an average of 4 square meters of collectors for each system, the campaign should involve about 25,000 user facilities for a total of about 100,000 square meters of installed collectors.

The corresponding nationwide saving in terms of reduced fuel oil imports should be around 12,000-14,000 tons per year.

In an effort to help the Southern Regions, in line with what was expressed and indicated by the CIPE [Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning], and to take into account the more favorable weather conditions, it was decided to distribute the quantity of 100,000 square meters in two parts: 60,000 square meters for the area of the Fund for the South and 40,000 square meters for the rest of Italy.

Funding for the "solar water-heater" campaign will be allocated to ENEL from the resources of the New Community Instrument for Loans and Insurance (Ortoli Allocation), coming from the award of loans on the money market by the Commission of European Communities. Through these steps, the Commission will decide on the acceptability of each project for funding purposes while the BEI will process the applications according to the customary criteria, discussing the grant of loans as well as the terms, and handling the necessary steps.

The above-mentioned funding volume will amount to a total of 54 billion lire and will be given to ENEL which, in turn, will use the money to give advances to the users who will provide for the installation of collector systems for the purpose of heating water for domestic use.

In practice, ENEL will give the user--when the system is finished and in operation--a money advance not to exceed 70 percent of the expenditure for the construction of the plant itself. The amount of the advance payment will differ from one case to the next, depending upon the category of the building involved. There will be a particularly low nominal annual interest rate on the order of 10.85 percent for the territory of the Fund for the South and 11.35 percent for the rest of Italian territory.

It is known as a matter of fact that the cost of a solar collector system decreases as we move from existing and residential installations (under category A) toward installations for nonresidential buildings used for rural, tourist, and agricultural purposes (category B) all the way to installations for buildings under construction (category C).

For this system the user moreover will be able to get a contribution from the region to the capital account up to a maximum of 30 percent of the investment expenditure and up to a ceiling of 15 million lire, as provided for in Law No 308, May 1982.

Referring to the value of currency at the end of 1982, one can estimate that the cost of one square meter of solar collector used will vary from 500,000 to 900,000 lire. The square meter itself on the average should yield an annual electric energy saving, at the user end, of about 460 kilowatt-hours in the North, 580 kilowatt-hours in the Center, and 600 kilowatt-hours in the South of Italy with annual savings in the utility bill varying between 70,000 and 90,000 lire, respectively, from North to South.

The periods of maximum rate assessment for the return of the advance payment are as follows: 7 years for Category A systems, 5 years for systems in Category B, and 3 years for systems in Category C.

Repayment will take place through constant amounts charged on the monthly electric bill. It is calculated that these amounts should vary between 17,000 and 33,000 lire per square meter of installed collector, according to the type of system and the amount of the advance.

From the technical and practical viewpoint, the "solar water-heater" campaign is aimed primarily at preventing a situation where components with an insufficient qualitative and functional level and poorly executed installations can diminish the advantages that may potentially be achieved with this type of system, in addition to unfavorably influencing public opinion regarding these types of solar energy use.

ENEL therefore drafted a pertinent agreement with solar collector building outfits following standardization of their products through suitable tests. These tests--which were entrusted to the Phoebus Company of Catania on the basis of specific requirements worked out by ENEL--include strict tests of quality, functional effectiveness, and duration of operation of the collector and the storage battery.

Only building companies whose products have been standardized and checked out by Phoebus will be allowed to join in the agreement and can therefore serve the user who is interested in this program. The list of solar collector construction companies accepted for participation in the agreement as of the end of August 1983 is given in Table I of "Estimate for Solar Water-Heater System Installation."

ENEL will furthermore make available to the user a list of reliable installers designed by the construction companies that were accepted for participation in the agreement. The user will furthermore be able to contact installers not shown on the list so that the latter may sign the commitment to set the system up in accordance with technical specifications given by ENEL.

In this way, the user will be able to get the benefit of a strong technical guarantee regarding the system's reliability in terms of construction and operation.

Here are the steps which the user must take to get the funding allocated for the "solar water-heater" campaign.

First of all, he must contact the ENEL zone with which he now has an electric energy supply contract. In this connection, it is recalled that the electric energy distribution and sales activities are carried out by ENEL through 170 "zones," distributed throughout national territory; a public assistance section has been set up in each zone. Personnel assigned to these sections will see to the delivery of informational material pertaining to the campaign and will help the user by making available to him the list of companies covered by the agreement and the list of reliable installers, broken down by provinces.

The user will then have to pick a company and work out an "estimate for the installation of a solar water-heating system" with it, complete in all sections provided for, and he will then have to submit it to ENEL.

After the technical personnel from ENEL have examined the blueprint (a rather general review, if the surface of the collectors to be installed is less than 30 square meters or a more detailed examination if it is more than 30 square meters) and after they have given their technical approval, the user will be able to work out the "agreement for advance funding for the installation of solar panels."

At the end of the work as such, ENEL technicians will make an on-site inspection to make sure that the system is in accordance with the blueprint and the technical specifications. At that point, the advance payment will be made; it may not exceed 70 percent of the expenditure figure given in the estimate.

Finally, ENEL will see to the debiting of the amortization rates [installments] directly on the [monthly] electric energy bills.

The relationship between ENEL and the user is thus, on the one hand, aimed at supplying the latter with the necessary technical assistance and, on the other hand, to advance him a large share of the expenditure for the system which remains the user's property.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

7 MARCH 1984